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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure in relation to firm-specific characteristics of listed 
mineral mining firms within the stakeholder theory framework developed by 
Ullmann (1985). Three indices, word index, unweighted index and weighted 
index, were applied to measure the extent of total environmental disclosure 
and categories of total disclosure, whicll were environmental policy and 
strategy, public recognition of environmental activities, prevention or repair of 
environmental damage and environmental liabilities. 
A sample of 104 mineral firms was selected from the Australian Graduate 
School of Management Annual Report Microfiche File for 1993. The 
relationships between the extent of environmental disclosure for the three 
indices, for total disclosure and each category of disclosure, and firm 
characteristics for twelve models in the stakeholder theory were tested by using 
multivariate analysis. 
It was found that the extent of environmental disclosure best fitted the 
unweighted jndex. The most significant form of disclosure was environmental 
policy and strategy and the least significant was environmental liabilities. All of 
the dimensions of stakeholder theory were not found to be present in any of the 
best models for total disclosure and each category of disclosure. The 
irnplications of these findings are that alternative variables for the stakeholder 
model need to be considered; that users of the annual report may obtain the 
best explanation of environmental disclosure through the use of an unweighted 
index; and that regulators of accounting information need to further examine 
the existing disclosure of environmental liabilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
In Australia, in recent decades, concern for the environment has 
increasingly received public attention. This increasing societal concern for 
environmental matters has heightened the demand for companies to be 
environmentally responsible. Mining companies have responded to the 
concern by implementing environmental activities and disclosing them in 
the annual report. 
Voluntary corporate environmental disclosure in the annual report has 
long been practiced by Australian companies (Trotman, 1979; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989). Researchers believe that there are factors driving firms to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information in the annual report and 
that this has resulted in a number of theories being proposed to explain the 
incidence of environmental disclosure. 
Investors and potential investors are interested in environmental 
information because environmental activities may have significant 
financial implications for companies (Gowland, 1995). It is noted that the 
l 
annual report is a source of information actively sought by users (Anderson 
and Epstein, 1995; Tilt, 1994; C. B. Roberts, 1991; Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990) 
because it contains information that enables users to assess potential 
financial effects of environmental concerns (Gibson and O'Donovan, 1994). 
Despite the existence of various environmental acts in Australia, the 
disclosure of environmental information in the annual report is not 
mandatory. 
I 
Given the perceived importance of environmental disclosure to the users of 
the annual report, this study attempts to explain the voluntary disclosure of 
this information by Australian listed mineral mining companies. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to explain tl,e inclusion, and the extent of, 
voluntary environmental disclosure practices in the 1993 annual reports of 
Australian listed mineral mining companies. Voluntary environmental 
disclosure is defined as any disclosure of mcnetary, non-monetary, 
quantitative, or non-quantitative information about environmental 
activities of a company that is not required by any form of legislation or 
standard (Cooke, 1989). In this study, the er,v1rohlli~ntal information is 
confined to that provided in the annual report. 
The inclusion and the extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the 
corporate annual reFort is examined by constructing three separate indices 
of disclosure and assessing their association with selected firm-specific 
characteristics. There are eleven corporate characteristics tested in this study 
and their relationships to the extent of environmental disclosure are 
empirically examined in tenns of overall disclosure and four categories of 
disclosure. 
The incidence of voluntary environmental disclosure is discussed in the 
framework of stakeholder theory. Corporate environmental reporting is 
examined from the perspective of the major stakeholder groups (Dierkes 
and Anthal, 1985) because "the use of the stakeholder concept is to provide 
information to strategists at a generic level ... " (Freeman, 1983, p. 36}. 
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Stakeholder conceptual framework, as developed by Ullmann (1985), is 
applied in this study to explab the incidence of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. 
1.3 Significance and Contribution of the Study 
The significance of the study is that there is a large number of mining 
companies in Australia and this has implications for the environment. This 
industry tends to be pressured from environmental groups (Deegan and 
Gordon, 1994) as its activities may damage the environment. This requires 
environmentally responsible actions from companies and the need to 
provide environmental information. Accordingly, this study provides 
information on the extent and the inclusion for environmental disclosure 
in the 1993 annual report of listed mineral mining companies in Australia. 
This information is valuable for the regulators and users of the corporate 
annual report. 
Thus far, there has been limited published research on environmental 
disclosure undertaken in Australia. This study extends prior research on 
environmental disclosure in Australia and overseas countries and 
contributes in two directions: first, by examining the relationship between a 
number of corporate characteristics within the dimensions of stakeholder 
theory and categories of environmental disclosure and, second, the 
examination of the extent of disclosure by a variety of indexing methods. 
Three indices, the number of words (referred to later as word index), 
dichotomous index (referred to later as unweighted index) and the relative 
importance of items (referred to later as weighted index), are selected. The 
reason is that they have different approaches to content analysis. This gives 
3 
fruitful insights as to the motivations of management and the likelihood of 
mc:lnagem£nt to voluntary disclose a certain category of environmental 
information. This should increase the understanding of practices of 
voluntary environmental disclosures in Australia by listed mineral mining 
companies. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
This thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 reviews the related literature of 
this study in Australia and other countries. Chapter 3 describes the 
theoretical framework that is used in the current study and the 
development of hypotheses. Chapter 4 explains the research design and 
method being used in this study whilst data analysis and discussion of 
statistical results are presented in chapter 5. Conclusions, findings and 
limitations of this study are stated in chapter 6. This chapter also provides 
suggestions for future research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter2 
LITERATURE REVlEW 
Public awareness of environmental matters has increased demand for 
information from firms with respect to their environmental activities. This 
r.:is resulted in a number of studies in this area. Jn prior studies, various 
theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the incidence of corporate 
environmental and social disclosure. These are legitimacy theory or social 
contract theory (Ramanathan, 1976; Shocker and Sethi, 1974), positive 
accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and stakeholder theory 
(Ullmann, 1985) and these theories have been empirically tested (Guthrie 
and Parker, 1989; Gray et al., 1991; Patten, 1992; Ness and Mirza, 1991; 
Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Deegan and Gordon, 1994; Blacconiere and 
Patten, 1994; R. W. Roberts, 1992). The results of the studies are presented in 
this chapter. 
2.2 Sh?.dies in Australia 
2.2.1 Social and Environmental Disclosure 
The tendency of companief: to voluntarily report social and environmental 
information in their annual repcrt has been of interest to researchers for a 
considerable period of time. Various approaches and methods have been 
undertaken to understand reporting practice of corporate social and 
environmental information. Table 2.1 summarises prior studies carried out 
in Australia. 
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Table 2.1 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Researcher(s) 
Trotman (1979) 
Pang (1982) 
Information Type 
Social Responsibility Dis-
closure 
Social Responsibility Dis-
closure 
Research Method 
Data source: 1967, 1972 and 
1977 annual reports. 
Sample of the 100 largest companies. 
Six major groups of disclosure 
were included: environment, 
energy, human resources, product, 
community involvement 
and other. 
The disclosure was distinguished 
into four categories: monetary 
and non-monetary quantification, 
monetary quantification, non-
monetary quantification, and 
non-quantitative information. 
The amount of disclosure was 
measured by the number of pages. 
Data source: 1980 annual reports. 
Sample was the first 70 largest firms 
and a further 30 listed firms were se-
lected at random. 
Social disclosures were grouped 
into five major areas: energy, 
environment, community 
involvement, human resources, 
Major Findings 
The amount of social responsibility disclosure 
increased during the periods studied. 
There was an increase in the number of 
companies providing quantified social 
responsibility information from 13 in 1967, 
to 19 in 1972 and to 33 in 1977. 
Thirty-five companies made some environ-
mental disclosure and the kinds of the 
disclosure varied widely. Ten firms made 
disclosures in relation to energy, thirty-five 
firms made some disclosure on staff training 
and twenty-six firms made disclosure in 
relation to safety and welfare of employees. 
The rationales for this increase were, first, to 
contribute to a good public image; second, to 
develop a sign of good management; and 
third, to achieve an annual report awards. 
The incidence of companies disclosing social 
disclosure had increased. The proportion of 
companies disclosing social responsibility 
was highest for the companies with market 
capitalisation $500 million or above. Thirty-
six out of seventy-nine firms disclosed 
quantified informatio~ monetary and non-
monetary terms. 
-..J 
Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Researcher(s) 
Guthrie and 
Parker (1989) 
Information Type 
Corporate social 
reporting 
Research Method 
products and consumer issues. 
Each firm was classified accor-
ding to the most prominent 
industrial activity in which it 
was engaged. 
Data source: A 100-year (1885-1985) 
study of annual and half-yearly 
reports (total of 177 rep()rts). 
Sample was a steel company (BHP). 
Social disclosure consisted of six 
themes: environment, energy, 
community involvement, product 
safety, human resources and others. 
The number of pages was used 
to measure the level of disclosure. 
Statistics: scatterplots. 
Major Findings 
The largest firms used monetary and non-
monetary methods of disclosure. 
Several of the companies devoted a separate 
section of their annual report to social respon-
sibility matters. Generally, larger firms tended 
to provide separate disclosure of their social 
activities than the smaller firms. 
Human resources was the most popular dis-
closure. The other two areas more often 
reported were community involvement and 
environment. 
Oil and mining, manufacturing, building 
and engineering companies provided the 
greatest number of disclosures on energy and 
environmental matters. 
Total social disclosure over the period studied 
varied greatly. 
Human resources and community involve-
ment were the predominant disclosures. 
Corporate reports were found to exhibit a 
variable pattern of total social disclosure 
levels over the history. 
Disclosures did not appear to be made as 
a consistent reaction to economic, social or 
political conditions or events. 
The results failed to confirm legitimacy 
theory. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Researcher(s) 
Tilt (1994) 
Gibson and 
O'Donovan 
(1994) 
Information Type 
Influence of pressure groups 
on Corporate Social 
Disclo~ure. 
Environmental disclosure 
and regulations develop-
ment. 
Research Method 
Data sources: annual report, 
booklets or leafletc,, advertisement 
labelling of products, and supple-
ments to annual report. 
Sample was 59 of 146 social organi-
zations throughout Australia 
(46.8% response rate), excluded 
highly specific interests (i.e. geolo-
gists, bird-watchers). 
A pilot study was undertaken to test 
the accuracy of the questionnaire. 
The impact of the significant num-
ber of environmental groups than 
other groups, was statistically 
tested. 
Statistical tests: Mann-Whitney 
U test, Fisher's Exact Probabilit:· 
test, Cochran's Q test, Chi-square, 
Kendall's Tau test, and Kruskal-
Wallis H test. 
Data source: a ten-year (1983-1992) 
study of annual reports. 
Sample of 41 listed companies. 
The reports were grouped on an 
industry basis, and 8 industry 
groups were identified: chemicals, 
oil and gas, paper & packaging, 
Major Findings 
Pressure groups had definite viewpoints about 
corporate social disclosure. 
Disclosure of descriptive and quantifiable in-
formation was necessary and annual reports 
was preferred place for the disclosure. 
Social information in a supplement to annual 
report received the second highest score for 
understanding (after advertisement) and the 
second highest score for credibility (after 
annual reports). 
The type of disclosure with the highest consi-
dered credibility was the annual report. 
It was perceived that legislation or standards 
were needed to ensure that companies were 
disclosing information about their activities 
that affected society. 
Almost all pressure groups attempted to in-
fluence companies; however1 neither confron-
tational view nor the co-operational view 
emerged as predominant. 
The number of companies reporting environ-
mental information had increased from 46% 
in 1983 to over 67% in 1992. 
The number of companies reporting financial, 
non-financial and descriptive environmental 
information had increased during the periods 
studied. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Researcher(s) 
Gowland (1995) 
Information Type 
Accounting and legal impli-
cau'ons in the restoration of 
mine sites 
Research Method 
engineering, transport, mining, 
solid fuels and miscellaneous. 
Types of environmental infor-
mation were classified into finan-
cial information, non-financial 
information, descriptive informa-
tion and total environmental 
information. 
The amount of disclosure was 
calculated by the number of pages. 
The sample was 46 publicly 
listed mining firms {13% of the 
tota.1 Australian listed mining 
population) selected from the 
Jobson's mining year book for 
1991/1992. 
Questionnaires were distributed 
to exploration and extractive 
companies. 
Statistical test chi-square 
Major Findings 
Each industry group showed a marked average 
percentage increase in the amount of total 
environmental disclosure. 
Chemical, engineering, solid fuels, paper and 
packaging, oil and gas, and mining industries 
recorded the largest increase in environmental 
disclosure. However, the disclosures in 
mining industry group were almost exclusive-
ly descriptive. It was difficult to link between 
increased environmental content in annual 
reports and increased environmental legisla-
ti.0 .. 1 because there was no uniform environ-
mental regulation applicable to publicly listed 
companies. 
More than 50% of the sample nominated 
legislation affecting them in respect of 
restoration. 
Extractive companies restored mine sites on 
completion of or during mining activities, 
while exploration companies were not subject 
to restoration requirements. 
Fourteen extractive companies employed 
full-time environmental officers. The 
majority of companies believed that consumer 
was ultimately responsible for funding the 
restoration of the environment. 
Income tax and assessment act (ITAA) discou-
Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Researcher(s) Information Type 
-0 
Research Method Major Findings 
raged expenses on mining restoration. 
The tendency to report mine site restoration 
had grown and it was envisaged disclosure of 
contingent liabilities would grow in the 
future. 
Trotman (1979) examined voluntary social responsibility disclosure made by 
the 100 largest Australian listed companies according to their market 
capitalisation. The survey compared the disclosures made in 1977 annual 
reports with disclosures in 1972 and 1967. The extent of social disclosure was 
measured by the number of pages devoted to six major social responsibility 
areas: environment, energy, human resources, products, community 
involvement and other. Types of information being disclosed were divided 
into four groups: monetary and non-monetary disclosure; monetary 
disclosure; non-monetary disclosure; and non-quantitative disclosure. 
It was found that the extent of social disclosure had substantially increased 
during the periods surveyed. The number of companies providing 
quantified social responsibility information had increased from 13 in 1967 to 
33 in 1977. Thirty-five per cent of the sample provided disclosure on 
environmental activities but in general qualitative terms. 
Trotman (1979) argued that there were several reasons for the increased 
disclosure. First, social responsibility reporting was used to develop a good 
public image. Second, corporate social responsibility could also be a sign of 
good management. Third, community pressure could exert influence upon 
social responsibility reporting. Finally, achieving annual report awards 
could be another incentive of firms to voluntary disclose social 
information. 
A follow up study was made by Pang (1982). Pang examined the 70 largest 
firms by their market capitalisation and a further 30 firms randomly selected 
from the remaining firms listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange. The purpose 
was to analyse the types of disclosure by industry classification. Disclosure of 
social information was made up of five major groups: environment, 
1 1 
energy, human resources, community involvement, products and 
consumer issues but Pang did not mention about measurement of 
disclosure. 
The findings demonstrated results similar to those of Trotman (1979) that 
the practice of social responsibility reporting had grown. There was an 
indication that different industries had positive associations with specific 
groups of information being disclosed. For example, manufacturing, oil and 
mining companies tend to voluntarily disclose environmental 
information. 
Guthrie and Parker (1989) undertook a historical study of corporate social 
reporting in Australia's largest steel company, Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Ltd. They examined the annual reports for 100 years from 1885-
1985. The level of disclosure was measured by the number of pages devoted 
to six areas: environment, energy, product safety, community involvement, 
human resources and others. Guthrie and Parker posited that corporate 
social disclosure was a reaction to environmental factors in order to 
legitimise company actions. 
They found that social disclosure over the period studied varied 
significantly. Human resources and community involvement were primary 
information provided in the annual reports. The environmental disclosure 
commenced in 1970 but it was somewhat patchy and marginally supported 
legitimacy theory. Based on the overall social disclosures, the results 
suggested that the legitimacy theory was not adequate as a means of 
explaining corporate social disclosure during the period studied. 
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Tilt (1994) surveyed the influence of pressure groups towards social 
respon:;ibility reporting. Data was obtained from annual reports, booklets or 
leaflets, advertisement, and supplemental reporting. The study sampled 59 
out of 146 social organisations. 
It appeared that pressure groups in Australia exerted, directly or indirectly, 
influences over social responsibility disclosure and approximately 81 per 
cent of the groups were environmental groups. Furthermore, it was asserted 
that pressure groups were likely to lobby with companies and government; 
however, their perceptions toward reporting of social and environmental 
responsibility were indeterminate. Tilt concluded that the pressure groups 
perceived the social disclosure in the annual report was the most reliable 
information. 
Research that focuses on environmental matters was UPct~rtaken by Gibson 
and O'Donovan (1994) and Gowland (1995). The earlier researchers looked 
at the relationship between environmental disclosure and the development 
of environmental legislation whilst the latter researcher surveyed the 
accounting and legal implications in the restoration of mine sites. 
Gibson and O'Donovan (1994), in their ten-year longitudinal study, 
examined 405 annual reports of 41 Australian publicly listed companies. 
The annual reports were then grouped into 8 industries. The amount of 
disclosure was calculated by foe number of pages. Gibson and O'Donovan 
noted that attachment to the environmental legislation could result in a 
variety of costs. This resulted from diverse national environmental 
regulations applicable throughout Australia. 
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However, it was found that the trend of companies to voluntarily disclose 
environmental information indicated an increasing pattern with an 
irregular upward trend. Mining companies increased their environmental 
disclosures approximately 1 % when disclosures in 1983 were compared with 
1992. The peak disclosure occurred in 1991. Also, the environmental 
information was descriptive. It appeared there was a tendency for 
disclosures to be associated with movements in the economic indicators. 
Gibson and O'Donovan conjectured there may be a negative association 
between company profitability and the degree of environmental 
responsibility disclosure, but they did not test this assumption. 
Gowland (1995) included 13% of the total population (at the time of study 
there were 350 mining companies) in his study. Mining compani€s have to 
incur considerable costs to restore mine sites and legislation affects them 
with respect to this restoration. However, Gow land noted that 61 % of the 
respondents did not believe that mining companies had to restore mine 
sites. This implied that mining companies were reluctant to restore mine 
sites, but legislation inevitably forced the companies to become involved in 
such restoration. Gowland predicted there would be an emerging need to 
disclose contingent liabilities in relation to future expenditures or 
compensation. 
In summary, corporate environmental disclosure has been investigated as a 
subset of social disclosure as well as a single set of environmental disclosure 
and indicated that the amount of disclosure increased across the studies. 
Various methods have been used to measure the degree of the disclosure 
but most of the previous studies applied a single method in one study. 
However, the studies did not observe a firm's incentives to do voluntary 
disclosure. 
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2.2.2 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 
There are various firm motives to voluntarily disclose information 
regarding social and environmental activities. Research indicates that firm 
characteristic:s play an important role on the extent of the disclosure. Table 
2.2 presents a summary of prior studies in Australia on the incentives of 
voluntary social and environmental disclosure. 
Tro:man and Bradley (1981) examined voluntary social disclosure made by 
the 207 largest Australian listed companies according to their market 
capitalisation. The objective was to examine whether the extent of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure made in the 1979 annual reports could be 
explained by four selected firm-specific characteristics. The extent of 
disclosure was measured by the number of lines. Trotman an.:i Bradley used 
total assets as a proxy of firm size, beta for systematic risk, social pressure 
and management's decision horizon. 
The results indicated that size, social pressure and management's horizon 
were positively correlated to the level of social disclosure. The refationship 
between systematic risk and the level of disclosure was not significant. 
Kelly (1981) surveyed fifty companies over the period 1969-1978 and 
classified them into three groups: primary, secondary and tertiary industries 
and treated this classification as one of three explanatory variables. The 
classification followed that of the Australian Associated Stuck Exchange 
(AASX). Kelly also included time horizon and the report recipient. The 
level of disclosure was measured by a dichotomous index based on the 
presence of the selected disclosure items. 
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Table2.2 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Australia 
Researcher(s) 
Trotman & Bradley 
(1981) 
Kelly (1981) 
Variables 
Firm size* 
Sys\.cmatic risk 
Social pressures* 
Management's 
decision horizon* 
Research Method 
Data source: 1979 annual 
reports. 
Sample of 207 large firms 
listed on the Australian Asso-
ciated Stock Exchange. 
Line-by-line measure method 
Statistics: chi-square, Mann-
Whitney, Spearman Rank 
Correlations 
Time horizon Data source: annual reports 
Report recipients* 1969-1978. 
Nature of in- Sample of 50 listed firms 
dustry Dichotomy approach 
Statistics: Chi-square, 
Spearman Rank Corre-
1 ations 
* positive and significant variable 
Major Findings 
Firms that made corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) were, on average, larger in si?.e 
had a higher systematic risk, and placed 
stronger emphasis on long term decisions. 
Positive association was found between 
CSR and firm size, the extent of social 
pressures faced by the company, and the 
emphasis the company placed on the 
long-term in making decisions. 
Lev~l of environmental disdosure had 
increased over the period studied. 
Larger corporations tended to disclose 
more environmental information than 
the smaller firms. 
Primary and secondary firms tended to 
disclose more environmental 
information than tertiary firms. 
-
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Australia 
Researcher(s) 
Deegan and 
Gordon(1994) 
Variables 
Environmental 
sensitivity * 
Positive envi-
ronmental dis-
closures 
Negative envi-
ronmental dis-
closure 
* positive and significant variable 
Research Method 
Data source: 1991 annual reports. 
Sample of 197 firms. 
Environmental groups were 
asked to rate environmental sen-
sitivity of an industry. 
Developed formulas to measure 
environmental sensitivity index. 
The extent of disclosure was 
measured as the average number 
of words. 
Three hypotheses were tested 
in the study. 
Statistical tests: Pearson product 
moment correlation, t-test, 
Wilcoxon matched pairs test, 
and Spearman's rank order. 
Major Findings 
The magnitude of environmental 
sensitivity of the fii-m within which 
that company operates was significantly 
and positively associated with the 
amount of positive environmental 
disclosure. 
The extent of positive environmental 
information disclosed was significantly 
greater than the amount of negative 
information. 
Management behaved opportunistically 
in its disclosu.te of environmental 
information. 
Voluntary social disclosure in the annual report increased during the 
periods studied. Firms in primary and secondary h1dustries tended to 
disclose more environmental information than those in tertiary industries. 
Also, with respect to firm size in terms of the number of report recipients, 
larger firms tended to disclose more environmental information than 
smaller firms. Kelly concluded that social responsibility disclosure had 
increased over the period studied. Kelly noted that the disclosure of 
corporate social responsibility information suggested the increasing 
importance in information content of annual reports. 
Deegan and Gordon (1994), using political cost theory, investigated the 
propensity of corporate environmental disclosure in 197 firms 1991 annual 
reports in the AGSM Annual Report File. The disclosures were categorised 
into positive and negative disclosure. Positive disclosures were defined as 
disclosures of "information which i-,resents the company as operating in 
harmony with the environment" (p. 6) and negative disclosures described 
as "disclosures that present the company as operating to the detriment of 
the environment" (p. 8). The amount of disclosure was calculated on the 
basis of the number of words. 
Instead of using firm size, Deegan and Gordon argued that environmental 
sensitivity of an industry may become a predominant factor determining a 
decision to make disclosures of environmental information. Ntvertheless, 
firm size was still included in the study as an additional test to see its effect 
on the amount of positive environmental disclosures. Three testable 
hypotheses were developed on the basis of \:.':ivironmental sensitivity and 
the nature of environmental disclosures being made. 
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Statistical results of Pearson product-moment correlation and Spearman 
correlation rank order strongly supported the hypotheses. There was a 
significant difference in the magnitude of positive and negative 
environmental disclosures made by Australian iisted companies. In 
addition, environmentally sensitive firms, particularly large firms, tended 
to voluntarily disclose positive environmental information in their annual 
reports. Deegan and Gordon concluded that voluntary environmental 
disclosures were undertaken opportunistically by management to reduce 
political costs they may have. 
2.2.3 Summary 
A number of empirical studies have been undertaken in Australia to 
investigate social and environmental disclosure. A few of the studies 
examined management's incentives to voluntarily disclose social and 
environmental information in their annual report. It appears that corporate 
characteristics influence management's decision to voluntarily disclose 
such information. In addition, pressure groups seek the adequacy of social 
and environmental information in the annual report and exert influence 
upon the extent of the disclosure. Environmentally sensitive firms tend to 
disclose environmental information in order to mitigate the imposition of 
political costs. 
2.3 Studies in Overseas Countries 
Extensive research on social and environmental disclosure has been 
conducted in overseas countries, particularly in the United States. This 
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section explures the previous studies in which the discussions are grouped 
into three subsections: studies on determinants of voluntary disclosure, 
enviromental disclosure and environmental performance1 financial 
performance and social and environmental performance. 
2.3.1 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 
Table 2.3 summarizes prior studies on the determinants of voluntary social 
and environmP.ntal disclosure in overseas countries. The majority of the 
studies focused on the quantity of overall corporate social responsibility 
disclosures. Cowen et al. (1987) and Maheshwari (1992) examined the 
relationship between individual corporate characteristics and the type of 
social responsibility disclosure measured on the basis of the number of 
pages. Cowen et al.'s (1987) study was undertaken in the United States and 
Maheshwari (1992) in India. 
In these two studies, seven specific types of social disclosure were adopted 
and related to company size, industry classification, profitability and the 
presence of a social responsibility committee. Cowen et al. (1987) classified 
the disclosure of environmental information into four groups: (1) pollution 
control; (2) prevention or repair of environmental damage; (3) conservation 
of natural resources; and (4) other environmental disclosures. 
Cowen et al. (1987) performed OLS multiple regression for total disclosures 
and for each category of disclosure against the independent variables. Size 
was the strongest explanatory variable both for total disclosure and for each 
type of disclosure. Cowen et al. also noted that type of disclosure did not 
directly relate to whether an industry has "high or low profile0 
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Table2.3 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Overseas 
Researcher(s) 
Cowen et al. 
(1987) 
Belkaoui & 
Karpik (1989) 
Variables 
Firm size "' 
Nature of industry * 
Profitability (ROE) 
Social Responsi-
bility Committee * 
Stock price return 
Systematic risk * 
Leverage# 
Profitability (ROA) 
Firm size* 
Capital intensity 
Dividends-retained 
,. positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Met.hod 
Data source: Ernst &Whinney 
1978 survey. 
Sample of 134 US firms from 
various industries. 
The degree of disclosure was 
measured by the number of 
pages method 
Seven areas of disclosure: energy, 
product, environment, human 
resources, community involve-
ment, fair business practices, and 
other. 
Statistics: descriptive tests, OLS 
multiple regression. 
Data source: survey of Ernst & 
Ernst 1973 and Business and 
Society Review. 
Sample of 23 US firms. 
Reputational index for social 
performance and social dis-
closure was scaled varying 
Major Findings 
Firm size had a significant impact on 
environmental, energy, fair business 
practices, community involvement, 
and other disclosures being made. 
Industry category appeared to have in-
fluenced some types of CSR (e.g. energy). 
The existence of a Social Responsibility 
committee appeared to correlate with 
disclosure of human resources. 
The conclusions drawn in this study 
related to the number of disclosures, not 
to the levei of corporate social activity. 
There was a significant and positive 
association between social disclosure and 
social performance. 
There was a significant and positive 
association between social disclosure and 
political visibility (measured by size and 
systematic risk). 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Overseas 
Researcher(s) 
Ness and 
Mirza (1991) 
Variables 
earning ratio # 
Social performance * 
Nature of industry * 
* positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Method 
from Oto 13. 
Independent variables were 
grouped into monitoring and 
contracting costs (leverage, 
dividends-retained earnings ratio), 
political visibility_ (size, 
capital intensity, systematic 
risk), and economic performance 
(ROA, stock price return). 
Statistics: plots, OLS multiple 
regression, normality, Shapiro-
Wilks test, ridge regression. 
Data source: annual reports 
for 1984. 
Sample was the top 131 UK 
companies from 6 industries. 
The companies were reclassified 
into two groups: oil industry and 
other industry. 
Four groups of disclosure were re-
classified into environment-related 
and other disclosure. 
Major Findings 
There was a significant negative asso-
ciation between social disclosure and 
financial performance. 
There was an insignificant and negative 
correlation, yet positive pairwise corre-
lation, between economic performance 
ann social disclosure. This may be a result 
of the presence of multicollinearity. 
There was a positive association between 
environment-related disclosure and the 
oil industry. 
The environment-related disclosure 
tended to be concerned with favourable 
social performance rather than with acti-
vities detrimental to the environment. 
91 % of the disclosure was descriptive and 
9% was non-financially quantified. Dis-
closure was not financially quantified. 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Overseas 
Researcher(s) 
R. W. Roberts 
(1992) 
Variables 
Stakeholder power 
(ownership#, levP.rage*, 
political action com-
mittee *) 
Strategic posture 
(public affairs* & 
philanthropic 
foundaticn*) 
Economic perfor-
mance (systematic 
risk#, return on equity*). 
Control variables 
(firm size, age*, and 
industry classification*) 
* positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Method 
Using dichotomous index. 
Analysing with agency theory 
framework. 
Statistical tests: Pearson's chi-
square, Yates' corrected chi-
square and cross-product ratio. 
Data source: annual reports 
for periods of 1984-1986. 
Sample was 130 US firms from 
7 industries. 
Used stakeholder theoretical 
framework. 
Statistics: chi-square, logistic 
multiple regression. 
Major Findings 
Based on agency theory, it was concluded 
that environmental disclosure was 
undertaken to increase the welfare of 
management. 
Stakeholder power, strategic posture, and 
economic performance were significantly 
related to the levels of corporate social 
disclosures. 
Corporations confronted with a high 
level of political exposure were more 
likely to disclose social responsibility 
activities. 
Social responsibility disclosure was 
perceived by management as a way to 
meet certain creditor expectations. 
Widespread stock ownership did not 
increase corporate incentives to make 
social responsibility disclosures. 
Corporations exhibiting relatively strong 
economic performance in prior periods, 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure: Overseas 
Researcher(s) 
Maheshwari 
(1992) 
Variables 
Firm size "' 
Type of industry .. 
Profitability (ROA) 
Social Responsibi-
lity Committee "' 
* positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Method 
Data source: arumal reports and 
Economic Times annual survey. 
Sample was 100 Indian firms 
from ten industries. 
The level of disclosure was 
measured by the number of pages. 
Total and subtotal disclosures 
were regressed against 
the independent variables. 
Statistics: descriptive tests, 
OLS multiple regression. 
Major Findings 
were more likely to have high current 
levels of social disclosure. 
Companies with less stable patterns of 
stock market return were relatively less 
likely to commit resources to social 
activities. 
Corporate age and industry classification 
that may act as intervening variables 
regarding social responsibility activities 
were supported. 
Firm size was a significant explanatory 
variable associated with types of social 
disclosure. The presence of Social 
Responsibility committee strongly related 
to human resources disclosures. 
Nature of industry related to disclosures 
of energy, environment, and community 
involvement. 
environmental impact. They argued that a company may be engaged highly 
in social responsibility activities, but did not disclose such activities in its 
annual report. Otherwise, some companies might be involved in relatively 
trivial activities, but make considerable disclosures. This finding led them 
to conclude that " ... discussing social responsibility disclosures as a total 
group may be disguising some very important differences in their treatment 
by corporations" (p.118-120). 
Maheshwari (1992) replicated the study of Cowen et al. (1987) but with 
different measures for profitability and firm size. Fortune rank was used by 
Cowen et al. as a surrogate of size, whereas Maheshwari used net assets as a 
measure of size. Cowen et al. measured profitability by return on equity 
(ROE) whilst Maheshwari adopted return on assets (ROA). Although firm 
size and profitability were measured differently the studies produced similar 
results. Firm size was a significant positive variable and profitability had a 
negative correlation to the extent of social disclosure. 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) investigated factors influencing management's 
decision to disclose social responsibility information. Using a positive 
accounting framework, they examined the relationship of two variables, 
social performance and economic performance, to social disclosure. The 
explanatory variables (operating leverage, systematic risk, stock price reru.rn, 
profitability, firm size, capital intensity, dividend-retained earnings ratio 
and social performance) were grouped into four categories: (1) social 
performance; (2) financial performance; (3) political visibility; and (4) 
economic performance. The extent of social disclosure was measured using 
a social disclosure scale derived from the Ernst and Ernst (1973) survey. The 
scale varied from O to 13. Social performance was measured on the basis of a 
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reputational index developed by Business and Socie~y Review and a sample 
of 23 US firms was used in this study. 
The results indicated that social disclosures were positively associated with 
social performance and political visibility. A significant negative association 
was found between social d isdosu.re and financial performance, but social 
disclosure had no association with economic performance. Belkaoui and 
Karpik suspected that these findings resulted from the presence of 
multicollinearity between economic performance variables. 
Ness and Mirza (1991) examined environment-related disclosure for the oil 
industry. They reviewed the 1984 annual reports of the top 131 companies 
in the UK according to sales turnover. The companies were taken from six 
industry groups (capital goods, consumer goods [durable], consumer goods 
[non-durable], commodity group, oil and miscellaneous) listed in Times 
1,000 Largest UK Industrial companies (1984-1985). Thev reclas.:;ified the 
industries into two groups: oil industry and other industries. Four areas of 
disclosure (product-related, employee-related, enviroi1ment-related and 
community-related) were reclassified into environment-related and other 
disclosures. Ness and Mirza found a positive relationship between 
environment-related disclosure and the oil industry. The disclosure tended 
to be concerned with favourable social performance rather than with 
activities detrimental to the environment. Using agency theory, they 
concluded that environment-related disclosures were undertaken to 
increase the welfare of management. 
R. W. Roberts (1992) focused on the examination of economic performance 
in prior periods to the extent of social disclosures. The degree of social 
disclosure was based on the rankings of the Council on Economic Priorities 
26 
(CEP) report, however, he did not disaggregate the disclosures into specific 
groups. ROE was positively associated with the extent of social disclosure, 
which was contrary to the finding of Cowen et al. (1987). A possible 
explanation for these different results is that they sampled from different 
time periods, used a different proxy of ROE, and different measures of the 
amount of disclosure. Roberts noted that economic performance in prior 
periods was associated with current levels of social disclosure. TI1us, there 
was a strong indication that a time period of financial and economic 
performance could affect the level of disclosure. The study also supported 
the application of the stakeholder model developed by Ullmann (1985) to 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
2.3.2 Environmental Disclosure and Environmental Performance 
The relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance was examined by Wiseman (1982\ Rockness (1985), and 
Freedman and Wasley (1990). Environmental performance was defined as a 
firm's actual environmental performance compiled by the Council on 
Priorities (CEP). The basic premise underlining their studies is that the 
extent of environmental disclosure could reflect company environmental 
performance. Table 2.4 presents a condensed summary on this research. 
Wiseman (1982) investigated the practice of environmental reporting made 
by 26 US firms from three environmentally sensitive industries. The degree 
of voluntary environmental disclosure was measured by the specificity of 
information items. A score of "three" was assigned to monetary or 
quantitative disclosure items; "two" for non-quantitaHve disclosure items; 
"one" for general disclosure items; and "zero" for the absence of disclosure. 
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Table2.4 
Environmental Disclosure and Performance 
Researcher{s) 
Wiseman (1982) 
Rockness 
(1985) 
Sample 
26 US firms from 
environmentally 
sensitive indus-
tries: steel, oil, 
pulp and paper. 
26 US firms from 
four industries: 
steel, oil, electric 
utilities and 
pulp and paper 
Research Method 
Data source: 1972-76 reports of CEP 
(Council on Economic Priorities). 
Developed indexing method on 
the basis of the specificity of in-
formation and line-by-line. 
Information items were selected 
through a review o'i the environ-
mental reporting literature. 
The index was made up of four 
different groups: monetary, 
non-quantitative, general terms 
and no disclosure. 
There were 18 items included in 
the index. 
Statistical test: Spearman's Rank 
Order Correlation. 
Data source: annual reports bet-
ween 1972 and 1976. 
Experimental study involving 
financial analysts, members of 
environmental institutions, 
Major Findings 
Voluntary environmental reports were 
inconsistent, providing inadequate disclosure 
for most of the environmental 
performance item included in the index. 
No relationship existed between the content 
of firms' environmental disclosures and 
firms' environmental performance. 
The usefulness of environmental reports 
contained within the corporate annual 
report for inter-company performance 
comparisons was questionable. 
The length of environmental disclosure 
did not represent better environmental 
performance. 
Environmental disclosures made in firms' 
annual reports were sufficient for users with 
diverse backgrounds to form consistent 
comparative evaluations of firms' environ-
mental performance within industry. 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Environmental Disclosure and Performance 
Researcher(s) Sample Research Method 
regulators and MBA students. 
Total of subjects was 128. 
A group of subjects was randomly 
assigned to assess one of the four 
industries. Each group comprised 
32 subjects. 
Firms' environmental disclosures 
were abstracted and no name and 
address of the firms. 
Subjects were instructed to rank 
overall environmental disclosure 
as the best to worst environmental 
performance. 
Statistic.al tests: Kendall's Coeffi-
cient Concordance, Kendall's W, 
Spearman's Rho, Spearman's 
Rank Order Correlation. 
Major Findings 
These evaluations were inaccurate 
interpretations of actual performance. 
Subject rankings of environmental 
performance were rarely associated 
with the corresponding the CEP .:an-
kings of actual performance. 
Need for environmental reporting 
requirements should be explored. 
w.) 
Q 
Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Em,ironmental Disclosure and Performance 
Researcher(s) 
Freedman and 
Wasley (1990) 
Sample 
50 US firms from four 
environment-sensi-
tive industries. 
Research Method 
Data source: lOK reports anc:1 
annual reports in 1972-1976. 
Adopted indexing procedures as 
used by Wiseman (1982). 
Information items and classifica-
tions were similar to '\tViseman's 
Statistical test: Spear·nan's Rank 
Order Correlation. 
Major Findings 
Neither voluntary annual report 
environmental disclosures nor 
mandatorv lOK environmental 
disclosures we.re indicative of actual 
firm environmental performance. 
Firms in oil industry with better 
environmental performance more 
extensively described their past and 
future expenditures for pollution 
abatement. 
The findings suggested the need to 
regulate voluntary annual report 
disclosures made by firms, and/ or 
the need for the SEC to improve its 
mandatory environmental disclosure 
r.equirement. 
The length of voluntary environmental disclosure did not describe better 
environmental performance of firms. Wiseman concluded that no 
relationship existed between the content of a firm's environmental 
disclosure and corporate environmental performance. Quality of the 
disclosure could not be linked to the length of the disclosure. The voluntary 
environmental disclosures were incomplete, providing inadequate 
disclosure for most of the environmental performance items included in 
the index. 
Subsequ.~ntly, Rockness (1985) assessed the relationship of environmental 
performance and environmental disclosure in an experimental setting. 
Financial analysts, environmental groups, regulators, and MBA students 
w~re asked to make comparative judgments about performance based on 
environmental jisclosures abstracted from corporate annual reports. The 
disclosure sheets for hrms were arranged in random order according to each 
industry. Each industry group was evaluated by 32 subjects, eight from each 
subject group. Subjects ranked the corporate disclosures into three equal 
piles: best environmental performance, average, and the worst 
environmental performance. Within each pile, the subjects were asked to 
sort the disclosures from the best to the worst in environmental 
performance. 
Subjects with similar backgrounds and areas of expertise made similar 
comparative judgments about corporate environmental performance from 
environmental disclosures. Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance and 
Kendall's W were used to test agreement among the subject in each group. 
It was concluded that subjects with different backgrounds and attitudes 
toward environmental performance interpreted corporate environmental 
performance in the same manner from the disclosures. In general, the 
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results indicated there were no significant differences between subject 
groups on evaluations of environmental performance. Rockness concluded 
that environmental disclosures made in the annual reports were adequate 
for users with diverse backgrounds to form consistent comparative 
evaluations of corporate environmental performance within industry. 
However, subjects' rankings of environmental performance were rarely 
associated with the corresponding CEP rankings of actual performance. 
Freedman and Wasley (1990) conducted a follow-up study extending the 
studies of Wiseman (1982) and Rockncss (1985) by investigating the 
association between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure made in annual reports and 10 Ks. This results indicated that 
mandatory environmental disclosures, as made in lOKs, did not appear to 
be more significant to actual environmental performance than voluntary 
disclosures made in the annual reports. In other words, environmental 
disclosures, mandatory and voluntary, do not reflect actual environmental 
activities of the companies. This may lead potential users of environmental 
reporting to ignore this information. Consequently, Freedman and Wasley 
suggested the need to regulate environmental disclosure in the annual 
report. 
2.3.3 Financial Performance and Social and Environmental 
Performance 
The relationship between financial performance and social and 
environmental performance has also been investigated. A review of prior 
studies on this area is summarized and presented in Table 2.5. 
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Table2.5 
Financial Performance and Environmental Performance 
Researcher(s) 
McGuire et al. 
(1988) 
Variables 
ROA* 
Total assets* 
Operating income 
growth# 
Sales growth 
Asset growth 
Debt to assets # 
Operating leverage* 
Systematic risk # 
Total return 
Risk-adjusted return 
Standard deviation 
of total return # 
Standard deviation 
of operating income 
* positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Method 
Data source: Fortune's annual 
survey for the period 1983-1985. 
and COMPUSTAT. 
Social Perfom1ance was taken 
from corporate reputations 
released in Fortune magazine. 
Sample was 131 US firms. 
Reliability and validity of the data 
were evaluated. 
Data on accounting- and stock-
market-based measmes and risk 
were obtained from COMPUSTAT: 
period of 1977-1981,1983-1985, and 
1982-1984. 
Statistical test: univariate (correla-
tion test) and multivariate 
(stepwise multiple regression). 
Major Findings 
There was little contemporaneous associ-
ation between corporate social perfor-
mance and and stock-market-based 
measures. 
There was a positive association between 
ROA and corporate social performance 
supporting the view that financial perfor-
mance affected social responsibility. 
The accounting- and stock-market-based 
risk measures tended to be negatively 
associated with social responsibility. The 
ratio of debt to assets had a significant 
negative association with corporate social 
responsibility. 
Corporate social responsibility was nega-
tively associated with the ratio of debt to 
assets, beta and the standard deviation of 
total return and positively associated 
with operating leverage in prior period. 
These suggested that low-risk firms and 
firms with a high return on assets would 
be better able to afford to act in a socially 
responsible manner. 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Financial Performance and Environmental Performance 
Researcher(s) 
Jaggiand 
Freedman (1992) 
Variables 
Net income# 
Return on assets # 
Return on equity# 
Cashflow / assets # 
Cashflow / equity # 
Systematic risk # 
Price/ earnings ratio # 
,. positive and significant variable 
# negative and significant variable 
Research Method 
Data source: 1978 pollution reports 
and COMPUSTAT tape. 
Sample was 13 US pulp and paper 
firms. 
Pollution index was developed 
based on Cannon (1974) and 
Freedman and Jaggi (1986). 
The variables were grouped into 
economic and market performance. 
Statistic tests: Pearson correla-
lation and Spearman rank order. 
Major Findings 
Measures of risk explained a significant 
portion of the variability in social respon-
sibility across firms. Accounting-based 
measures, particularly ROA, proved to be 
better predictors of corporate social res-
ponsibility than market measures. 
Prior financial and economic perfor-
mance was generally a better predictor of 
corporate social responsibility than subse-
quent performance. 
There was a negative association between 
pollution performance and economic 
performance over a short period of time, 
but this association had opposite direc-
tion during the period after the reporting 
year particularly for ROA and ROE indi-
cators. 
The market reacted differently to pollu-
tion performance in terms of systematic 
risk and price/ earnings ratio. 
Firms with higher risk had better pollu-
tion performance but investors valued 
these firms lower. 
McGuire et al. (1988) investigated 131 US firms to test the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility a:d firm financial performance by 
considering time periods of corporate financial performance. Financial 
performance measures were classified into accounting-based performance 
and market-based performance measures. Accounting-based performance 
measures consisted of ROA, average assets, operating income growth, sales 
growth, asset growth, debt to assets ratio, operating leverage and standard 
deviation of operating income. Market-based performance was measured by 
risk-adjusted return, total return, systematic risk and standard deviation of 
total return. It was hypothesised that prior, concurrent, and subsequent 
financial performance was associated with corporate social responsibility. 
Corporate social responsibility was defined as corporate reputations released 
by Fortune magazine. 
The results showed that accounting-based measures (ROA, total assets, sales 
growth, asset growth, and operating income growth) were better predictors 
of social responsibility than market-based measures (risk-adjusted return 
and total return). Also, prior financial performance was a better predictor of 
corporate social responsibility than subsequent financial performance. 
McGuire et al. perceived that the association between concurrent social 
responsibility and financial performance may partially be artifacts of prior 
high financial performance. Therefore, McGuire et al. suggested that future 
research should consider the influence of prior firm financial performance 
on corporate social performance. 
Jaggi and Freedman (1992) examined the impact of pollution performance 
on economic and market performance. They undertook a cross-sectional 
study of 13 US pulp and paper firms. Pollution data was extracted from 
pollution reports filed by firms with the EPA whilst economic and market 
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performance data were taken from the COMPUSTAT tapes. Economic 
performance variables were net income, return on equity (ROE), ROA, cash 
flow/ equity, and cash flow/ assets. Market performance variables were 
systematic risk and the price/ earnings ratio. Jaggi and Freedman developed 
two hypotheses to examine the short-term effects of pollution performance 
on prior, current and subsequent years of economic and market 
performance. 
They reported a significant negative association between current pollution 
performance and current economic performance in the years preceding 
economic performance, but this association was positive in the period after 
the reporting year for ROA and ROE indicators. In addition, market 
performance indicators indicated negative correlation coefficients. Better 
pollution performance was associated with higher risk and investors valued 
these firms lower. 
A considerable number of studies have investigated whether social and 
environmental disclosure have information content, and whether 
investors or stock markets react to social and environmental disclosure (e.g., 
Alexander and Bucholz, 1978; Ingram, 1978; Spicer, 1978; Anderson and 
Frankle, 1980; Belkaoui, 1980; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Shane and Spicer, 
1983; Mahapatra, 1984; Freedman and Jaggi, 1986; Patten, 1990; Freedman 
and Stagliano, 1991; Epstein and Freedman, 1994; Blacconiere and Patten, 
1994). These empirical studies have not been reviewed because they are not 
directly relevant to the current study. 
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2.3.4 Summary 
There are various firm-specific characteristics which influence the extent of 
social and environmental disclosure. Different proxies of profitability and 
firm size have resulted in mixed findings. The relationship between both 
corporate social and environmental performance and corporate financial 
and economic performance in different time periods has also been tested 
and found to be associated. 
2.4 lnt?mational Comparative Studies 
Social and environmental initiatives in the business community are 
growing, especially in developed countries, which has drawn the attention 
of researchers to examine if there is a diversity of social and environmental 
responsibility reporting among these countries. A summary of literature 
review on international comparative research in this area is provided in 
·:.:able 2.6. 
Guthrie and Parker (1990) examined corporate annual reports in the US, UK 
and Australia and used the origins of companies as an independent vari-
able. A sample of the 147 largest companies by their market capitalisation 
from all three countries were selected. Four testable dimensions were deve-
loped based on theme, evidence, amount and location of the disclosure in 
the annual report. Two theoretical frameworks, user utility and political 
economy theory, were adopted to analyse the practice of social and envi-
ronmental disclosure in those countries. 
Based on a user utility, which considered the effectiveness of disclosures to 
communicate with and to meet various interest groups, Guthrie and Parker 
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Table2.6 
International Comparative Studies 
Researcher(s) 
Guthrie and 
Parker (1990) 
Variable 
Theme, amount, 
evidence, location~ 
and total of dis-
closure 
Method 
Data source: the 1983 annual 
reports. 
Sample was 147 largest listed firms 
from 4 countries. The origins of 
firms were used as an 
independent variable. 
Theoretical frameworks of user 
utility and political economy 
were used to explain the data. 
Three countries included in the 
study were Australia, UK, and 
us. 
Five null hypotheses were 
developed for the study. 
Statistical test: chi-square. 
Major Findings 
There was a significant difference 
between countries and their dis-
closure of social information. 
There was a significant difference 
in the method of social disclosures 
existed between countries. 
There was a significant difference 
with respect to the location of 
social disclosure for the three 
countries. 
There was no significant difference 
with respect to amount of disclo-
sure between the countries 
surveyed. 
All 3 ·countries adopted a common 
ranking for the importance of 
disclosures on human resources, 
environment, and community 
involvement. 
A sizeable proportion of corporate 
social disclosure appeared to be 
made re-actively rather than 
pro-actively. 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
International Comparative Studies 
Researcher(s) 
C. B. Roberts 
(1991) 
Variable 
Germany, Nether-
lands, France, 
Sweden and Swit-
zerland. 
Method 
Data source: the 1988 and 1989 
annual reports. 
Sample was 110 companies. 
Only companies with 
English language reports 
were included in the sample. 
54 specific environmental items 
were classified into 9 types of 
information. 
Statistical test: ANOV A. 
Major Findings 
The levels of disclo~~.ire were 
viewed as testament to the 
perceived importance attached 
by social, political, and economic 
interest groups to the disclosure 
of non-market impact of 
corporate activity. 
The majority of firms disclosed 
at least some environmental 
information; however, the level 
of disclosure was generally low. 
On average, companies disclosed 
less environmental information 
than employee-related 
information. 
Environmental disclosure practice 
did not generally appear to follow 
country-specific patterns. 
There appeared to be relatively few 
consistent differences in terms of 
the number of items disclosed. 
found significant differences in the disclosure of social information in terms 
of method and location of the disclosure. Compared to other countries, 
Australia had a relatively low rate of corporate social disclosure. The 
disclosure in Australia predominantly contained human resource 
information. Most of the disclosure was primarily in non-monetary terms 
and located in a variety of non-specific sections in corporate annual reports. 
A~cording to the political economy perspective, it was found that social 
disclosure was made reactively rather than proactively. This disclosure was 
used to demonstrate a constructive response to public expectations or to 
avoid further regulation of the disclosure. Thus, corporate social and 
environmental disclosure were made "to sustain and legitimise existing 
economic and political structures in the business and wider communities" 
(p. 171). Guthrie and Parker further noted that social disclosure was viewed 
to reflect public social priorities, response to government pressure, 
accommodate environmental pressures and project corporate image. 
The growing environmental concern in European countries stimulated 
C. B. Roberts (1991) to investigate practices of environmental disclosure in 
mainland European countries with respect to the overall level of disclosure 
and nine specific groups of environmental information being disclosed. A 
sample of 110 companies was selected from five countries: France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The incidence of environmental disclosure did not follow country-specific 
patterns. This meant that environmental reporting among countries being 
observed followed general or common patterns. However, there were few 
consistent differences in terms of the number of environmental items being 
disclosed. German firms disclosed the highest amount of environmental 
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information. However, disclosure of the majority of companies in the 
sample was generally low. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The results of the studies reported here indicate that corporate social and 
environmental disclosure has increased over the last two decades. The 
studies also appear to lend support to the contention that there is an 
association between corporate characteristics and voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure. However these studies do possess certain 
shortcomings. The extent of voluntary disclosure was not measured by an 
unweighted and weighted index simultaneously. Neither were alternative 
indices measured against categories of voluntary environmental disclosure 
variables. Further, the effect of alternative time periods of economic 
performance was not considered. 
The methodology employed in the current study is designed to overcome 
the shortcomings mentioned. Three different indices, word index, 
unweighted index and weighted index, are simultaneously applied to 
categories of voluntary environmental disclosure. The inclusion of prior 
and current year of economic performance variables is considered. Also 
other variables which have not been previously tested (market 
capitalisation, the membership of the Australian Mining Industry Council 
(AMIC) and commercial production), are included in the current study. 
Explanations of the selected corporate characteristics and theoretical 
framework that will be applied in this study are presented in chapter 3. 
Hypotheses development is also discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion in chapter 2 indicates that various corporate characterisHcs 
are associated with the level of voluntary environmental and social 
disclosures. 
In this chapter, stakeholder theoretical framework, which is used in the 
current study, is elaborated. The stakeholder theory looks at the 
environmental disclosure from the perspective of corporate management to 
strategically maintain the corporation's continued existence (Gray et al., 
1995). The reason for choosing this theoretical framework is that 
stakeholder theory provides a coherent conceptual framework to an 
organization "to manage the relationships with its specific stakeholder 
groups in an action-oriented way" (Freeman, 1984, p. 53). Companies are 
developing new modes of cooperation with their various stakeholders to 
attain a sustainable corporation (Elkington, 1994). Thus, this theory can help 
explain the growing environmental actions of the companies. 
This chapter describes the incidence of environmental disclosure in relation 
to the dimensions of stakeholder theory and discusses explanatory variables 
used in this study within the stakeholder dimensions. This chapter first 
discusses the concept of stakeholder theory as proposed by Ullmann (1985). 
The next section will elaborate on the independent variables used in this 
study associated with the theory, whilst the last section will conclude with 
discussion of this chapter. 
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3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
3.2.1 Stakeholders 
Stakeholders are defined as "groups and individuals who can affect and are 
affected by the achievement of an organization's mission" (Freeman, 1984, 
p. 38). Stakeholders can be varied, but, in general, they consist of 
government, regt:.latory bodies, customers, shareholders, accounting 
profession, environmental groups, and financial institutions. DisdosurL' of 
environmental inform.:iiwn 1s used to communicate with a company's 
stakeholders (Dierkes and Anthal, 1985) to foster mutual partnerships 
towards a "greening" world (Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992). 
Each stakeholder may be interested in different types of environmental 
information and seeks the information from reports made by the company 
or external organizations (Shane and Spicer, 1983; Mastrandonas and Strife, 
1992; Epstein and Freedman, 1994). However, environmental information 
in the annual report is the major source used by a wide range of users (C. 
Roberts, 1992). In addition to making financial and investment decisions, 
stakeholders use the information to assess a corporate's activities toward 
environmental objectives and the effects of such activities on corporate 
wealth (Cowe, 1992), and corporate growth and profitability (Greeno and 
Rohnson, 1992). Thus, there is a need for the environmental information 
by stakeholders in the company. 
In managing environmental activities and in order to keep in balance 
responses to stakeholders, management attempts to satisfy nontraditional 
stakeholder demands for environmental information so as to achieve its 
objectives (Thompson et al., 1991; R. W. Roberts, 1992). Furthermore R. W. 
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Roberts argued that a successful company must consider the differential 
power of each stakeholder on resource allocations. The next section 
discusses the dimensions in the stakeholder theory. 
3.2.2 Stakeholder Model 
The stakeholder model developed by Ullmann (1985) consists of three 
dimensions: stakeholder power, strategic posture, and economic 
performance. The incidence of environmental disclosure can be approached 
by these three dimensions of the stakeholder theory. 
The stakeholder power is defined as the willingness of a firm to respond to 
the intensity of stakeholder demands (R. W. Roberts, 1992). Strategic 
posture, in relation to environmental reporting, is the resp0nse mode of a 
company's management concerning environmental demands (Ullmann, 
1985). Economic performance, in the past and current period, is a significant 
factor to develop an environmentally responsible action as this action 
incurs considerable costs. Further explanation on these dimensions is 
provided in the next section. Also, the explanatory variables used in the 
current study are discussed in this section and hypotheses are developed. 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Eleven independent variables are selected to represent the three dimensions 
of the stakeholder theory. These variables are ownership, political pressure, 
operating leverage (as proxies of stakeholder power), the presence of 
corporate environmental committee (as a proxy of strategic posture), return 
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on assets, return on equity, and systematic risk (as proxies of economic 
performance), firm size, capital intensity, independent auditor and 
commercial production (as control variables). 
3.3.1 Stakeholder Power 
A stakeholder has differential power dependent on the degree of control 
over resources required by the company (Ullmann, 1985). The more critical 
the stakeholder resources, the greater the willingness of the company to 
satisfy the stakeholder demands. As environmental activities absorb 
considerably an entity's resources, stakeholders demand information about 
environmental responsibility activities if the activities have financial 
implications. Also, as environmental matters has heightened public 
attention, the company responds it by developing an environmentally 
responsible action and produces information about its activities on the 
environment. Therefore, the company is willing to disclose these activities 
in annual report. 
Empirical evidence suggests that environmental responsibility activities 
and disclosures are useful in developing and maintaining good 
relationships with stakeholders (Gibson and O'Donovan, 1994; 
Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992). Under this model, a positive correlation 
between stakeholder power and environmental disclosure is expected. 
Several proxies can be used to represent stakeholder power: ownership, 
leverage, political pressure. Justications for developing hypotheses on these 
variables are provided below. 
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3.3.1.1 Ownership Diffusion 
Knowledgeable investors may consider corporate environmental 
responsibility activities in making their investment decisions because 
environmental expenditures can reduce surplus (earnings) available for 
owners (Cooper, 1988). The adequacy and appropriateness of particular 
environmental expenditures is critical. For example, information relating to 
penalty and capital expenditure were the most frequently demanded by 
investors (Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992). 
Research on the relationship between ownership and corporate social and 
environmental disclosure has produced mixed results. As a consequence of 
the Exxon Valdez accident, firms that affiliated with Alyeska Pipeline 
Service company (as a proxy of ownership) increasingly disclosed 
environmental information (Patten, 1992). In contrast, R. W. Roberts (1992) 
found that ownership diffusion, i.e., 5% or more of outstanding ordinary 
shares held by management or other individuals, was not a significant 
predictor for the degree of corporate social responsibility disclosures. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) found that the concentration of ownership in a 
firm explained the extent of additional information voluntarily provided by 
a firm, such as environmental information, in its annual report. Dispersed 
ownership, particularly environmentally concerned investors, will force 
management to report environmental responsibility activities (Ullmann, 
:985). Therefore, it is predicted that firms widely held by shareholders are 
more likely to voluntarily disclose environmental information in their 
annual report than firms closely held by shareholders. The relationship 
between ownership and the dependent variable is stated in hypothesis Hl: 
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Hl: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is negatively 
related to ownership diffusion. 
In this study, ownership is described as a percentage of outstanding ordinary 
shares owned by the top twenty shareholders. 
3.3.1.2 Operating Leverage 
Leverage can capture the importance of creditors as stakeholders in a firm's 
wealth. Creditors and fh1anciai lending institutions may share in potential 
liabilities if their loans are secured by contaminated properties (Davey, 1994; 
Williams and Phillips, 1994). As a result, they may demand additional 
information in order to assess the probability of a firm meeting their debt 
obligations. There are conflicts of interest related to environmental 
liabilities and the incentives of management to report these liabilities 
because disclosure of potential environmental liabilities may be perceived 
as an admission of guilt (Cerf, 1993). This implies that disclosure of 
environmental responsibility should be linked to loans approval. If 
creditors are concerned with environmental responsibility activities, the 
company is more likely to disclose its environmental activities. 
Research on the relationship between leverage and corporate social 
responsibility has produced conflicting results. Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) 
and McGuire et al. (1988) reported a significant negative association between 
operating leverage (a ratio of total debt to total assets) and the level of social 
disclosure and social performance. On the other hand, R. W. Roberts (1992) 
employed a different measure and found that the financial leverage (a ratio 
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of total debt to total equity) has a positive relationship with social 
responsibility disclosure. 
Considering those empirical findings and the contention that creditors' 
influences should be managed (R. W. Roberts, 1992), it is expected that firms 
with high leverage will have a greater creditor's influence. Therefore, 
highly levered firms are likely to disclose more environmental information 
in their annual reports compared to firms with low leverage. The reason is 
that creditors can force firms to provide information about environment-
related activities. Hypothesis H2 is expressed as follows: 
H2: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to operating leverage. 
Operating leverage is measured as a ratio of total debt to total assets as used 
by Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) and McGuire et al. (1988). Previous empirical 
research also indicates that time period of leverage has an effect on the level 
of environmental disclosure. McGuire et al. (1988) suggested consideration 
of time period of financial performance (e.g., leverage) in conducting a 
corporate environmental responsibility study. They argued that it is worthy 
to consider prior financial performance as an explanatory variable 
influencing corporate social responsibility rather than concurrent or 
subsequent financial performance. This implies that there may be different 
effects of prior and current leverage on the extent of environmental 
disclosure. Therefore, as this study also takes account of different time 
period of leverage, hypothesis H2 can be specified further into the following 
forms: 
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H21: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to operating leverage in the previous year. 
H22: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to operating leverage in the current year. 
3.3.1.3 Political Pressure 
Mineral mining companies may bear political constraints. These pressures 
stern from international as well as national legislation. At an international 
level, firms that are operating in overseas countries, particularly in 
developing countries, have to comply with the requirements of the United 
Nations, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation 
(O'Neill, 1993) in addition to related-country regulations. At a national 
level, the Australian government has placed strict regulations on the 
environment at Federal, State and local government levels (Australian 
Mining Industry Council [AMIC], 1993b; Gibson and O'Donovan, 1994). For 
example, New South Wales requires 50 permits, whereas Northern 
Territory requires 600 permits for new mining companies (Gomez, 1992). 
Uncompetitive taxation, land access restriction, legislative processes and 
inefficient bureaucracy are other major deterrents to mining industry 
(Rydge's, 1986; Champion de Crespigny, 1994). These are perceived as 
governmental intrusions that adversely affect a firm's value (R. W. Roberts, 
1992). A company may collaborate with other mining companies in the 
same industry to bargain or lobby with government in order to reduce those 
intrusions. 
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Bell and Warhurst (1993) concluded that large firms associated with the 
Business Council of Australia (BCA) tend to be more politically active, in 
terms of dealing with political environment and the level of relationship to 
government, than non-member firms. This finding is commensurate with 
US studies, where a number of firms have become increasingly involved in 
a political action committee to affect political decision making (Keim and 
Baysinger, 1988). Furthermore, R. W. Roberts (1992) pointed out that 
"[h]igher levels of perceived governmental influence on corporate activity 
would be expected to lead to a greater effort by management to meet 
expectations of government". (p. 602) 
The development of strategic corporate reporting can be used to reduce the 
perceived political pressure or governmental influence (Huizing and 
Dekker, 1992). As government may introduce political constraints by 
requiring firms to address the perceived environmental problems, the firms 
disclose information about environmental program and policy in their 
annual report explaining that they comply with environmental standard 
and regulations. 
Membership of the AMIC is selected as a proxy of political constraints. There 
are two reasons why AMIC membership is chosen; first, despite the 
existence of many sub-mining organizations, the Council represents the 
majority of mining firms which operate throughout Australia. Second, the 
Council seems to be more politically powerful than other mining 
organizations to negotiate or lobby with government and environmental 
groups because the mining industry is fundamental to Australia's economic 
development (AMIC, 1994; Barnett, 1994). Third, the AMIC develops and 
proposes environmental objectives and standards to government in which 
these standards must be adopted by the members. 
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Different pressures of government on corporate environmental 
responsibility may lead to differential disclosure patterns across companies. 
The provision of environmental disclosure is viewed as a reactive response 
to social pressures (Guthrie and Parker, 1990). As the activities of mining 
companies are susceptible to detriment of the environment, the AMIC 
members may develop together a strategy and policy to restore the 
environment including the provision of environmental report. It is 
assumed that firms which are members of the AMIC are likely to disclose 
environmental information to reduce political constraints or political 
actions undertaken by government and pressure groups because they are 
more informed than non-AMIC companies. Therefore, it is predicted that 
there is likely to be an association between membership oi the AMIC and 
corporate environmental disclosure. Hypothesis H3 is formulated as 
follows: 
H3: The voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual report of 
Australian listed mineral mining companies is likely to be related to 
the membership of the AMIC. 
3.3.2 Strategic Posture 
The strategic posture of the firm can be passive or active. Active strategic 
posture means that a firm is performing environmental activities 
proactively to address stakeholder influences, for example, by establishing a 
special department or committee, which is responsible for preparing and 
developing programs, policies and strategies relating to environmental 
matters. Passive strategic posture means that a firm does not develop a 
specific policy or program to address the existing environmental issues. 
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Strategic posture of a company is positively associated with the extent of 
disclosure. Stakeholder theory posits that the more active the strategic 
posture, the more likely a company is to carry out environmental activities 
and disclosures. 
3.3.2.1 The presence of an Environmental Responsibility Committee 
Bowman and Haire (1975) investigated the strategic posture of firms related 
to corporate social responsibility. Ullmann (1985) distinguished a firm's 
strategic posture as either active or passive. A firm has an active strategic 
posture if corporate management develops a specific department dealing 
with environmental matters to address its stakeholder influences. If 
corporate management does not set up specific programs and monitor its 
relation to stakeholders, this is perceived as a passive strategic posture. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the presence of a social responsibility 
committee could explain the extent of social disclosure (Cowen et al., 1987; 
Maheshwari, 1992). Similarly, the existence of a corporate environmental 
responsibility committee can describe the strategy of a company in 
addressing environmental issues. In essence, the presence of an 
environmental responsibility committee is used to influence stakeholders 
through environmental responsibility activities. Therefore, the presence of 
an Environmental Committee is selected as a proxy of a firm's strategic 
posture. 
Companies that have an environmental responsibility committee and 
mention it in the annual report are perceived to have an active strategic 
posture. If companies do not mention it in their annual report, they are 
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deemed to have a passive strategic posture. It is posited that companies that 
provide an environmental responsibility committee are more likely to 
disclose environmental activities. Thus, there is a positive relation between 
the presence of an environmental committee and voluntary 
environmental disclosure in an entity's annual report. Hypothesis H4 is 
stated as follows: 
H4: The voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual report of 
Australian listed mineral mining companies is likely to be related to 
the presence of an environmental responsibility committee. 
3.3.3 Economic Performance 
The third dimension concerns the past and current economic performance 
of the firm. As dealing with environmental matters involves considerable 
funds, economic perform&nce will directly affect a firm's financial capability 
to set up environmental programs. For example, in the United States, 
environmental expenditures can reach as high as $46 billion per year or 2% 
of sales (Greeno and Robinson, 1992) or 25% to 60% of earnings 
(Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992) and these costs are likely to increase in the 
years to come. 
It is believed that economic performance and environmental responsibility 
activities are related (Bowman and Haire, 1975; Spicer, 1978) and they are 
inseparable components of sustainable development (AMIC, 1993a; 
Bebbington, 1993; Batley and Tozer, 1993). Therefore, it is expected the more 
favourable the economic performance of a firm, the more likely it is to 
engage in environmental activities and disclosures. In contrast, financially 
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distressed firms may not be likely to engage in environmental activities 
and, therefore, they may have less disclosures. Profitability and systematic 
risk, as measures of economic performance, are perceived as causal factors 
that allow management to undertake more extensive environmental 
responsibility programs (R. W. Roberts, 1992). The reason is that acceptable 
levels of economic performance are necessary to meet environmental 
demands from stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985). Proxies of economic 
performance used in the current study are return on assets, return on equity 
and systematic risk. 
3.3.3.1 Return on assets (ROA) 
ROA has been used as a measure of economic performance in prior studies 
and has resulted in conflicting findings. For example, Belkaoui and Karpik 
(1989) reported that ROA had a negative association with corporate social 
disclosure. Also, Jaggi and Freedman (1992) reported a negative association 
with corporate environmental performance. However, Belkaoui and Karpik 
suspected the existence of multicollinearity between leverage and systematic 
risk caused this result. In contrast, McGuire et al. (1988) found that ROA, 
particularly in prior period, had a positive relationship with corporate social 
performance. 
It is predicted that companies that have larger ROA are likely to disclose 
more environmental information in their annual reports. The reasons are 
that, first, those companies want to demonstrate the superior skill of the 
management keeping the firm profitable whilst achieving environmental 
responsiveness (Bowman and Haire, 1976; Alexander and Bucholz, 1978). 
Second, with a greater ROA, companies can achieve economic efficiency 
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whilst protecting and improving the environment (Miller, 1992). 
Management may have to replace old and inefficient capital with new, 
environment-friendly and efficient capital to obtain positive economic 
effects (Freedman and Jaggi, 1994) which will have beneficial implications 
for stakeholders (Greeno and Robinson, 1992). If a company adopts 
environmentally sensitive technology and equipment, it is likely the 
company to disclose it in the annual report. 
Even though environmental activities involve a considerable outlay of 
funds, larger firms tend to have better environmental performance as well 
as economic performance (Chen and Metcalf, 1980). Therefore, this study 
predicts that firms with higher ROA are likely to voluntarily disclose more 
environmental responsibility activities in their annual report than firms 
with small ROA. Hypothesis HS is formulated as follows: 
HS: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to ROA. 
Gibson and O'Donovan (1994) contended that t~1e time period of 
profitability can affect the tendency of corporate envi::onmental disclosure. 
Empirical evidence suggests that firms with high ROA in the prior period 
are better able to afford to act in an environmentally responsible manner 
(McGuire et al., 1988). This study includes different time periods of ROA to 
examine whether prior and current year ROA is associated with the extent 
of voluntary environmental disclosure. In relation to this, the 
aforementioned hypothesis can be expressed in two forms: 
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HSl: The extent of voluntary environmental disclo~ure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the ROA in the prior year. 
H52: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the ROA in the current year. 
3.3.3.2 Return on equity (ROE) 
Another measure of economic performance is ROE. Prior empirical studies 
demonstrate conflicting results. The findings of certain studies indicate a 
positive association between ROE and social and environmental 
responsibility disclosure (Spicer, 1978; Mills and Gardner, 1984; R. W. 
Roberts, 1992) whereas the findings of other studies suggest a negative 
association with social and environmental performance (Bowman and 
Haire, 1975; Jaggi and Freedman, 1992). This implies that companies tend to 
have environmentally responsible activities but they are contingent upon 
their financial profiles (Mills and Gardner, 1984). 
It is perceived that meeting environmental responsibility goals is a 
secondary objective because an acceptable level of economic performance is 
necessary prior to devoting resources for environmental activities 
(Ullmann, 1985; R. W. Roberts, 1992). Therefore, this study predicts that 
firms with larger ROE are likely to voluntarily disclose more 
environmental information. Hypothesis H6 is expressed as follows: 
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H6: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the ROE. 
R. W. Roberts (1992) indicated that a time dimension of ROE appears to 
have effects on the level of environmental disclosure. More importantly, he 
concluded that strong ROE in the prior period is positively associated with 
current levels of social disclosure. However, he did not examine the 
relationship of current ROE and current social disclosure to check the 
association. This study takes account of that association and therefore the 
above hypothesis can be specified into two forms: 
H61: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the ROE in the prior year. 
H62: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the ROE in the current year. 
3.3.3.3 Systematic Risk 
Systematic risk is defined as the contribution of the individual security to 
portfolio risk. Previous empirical studies have tested the association 
between systematic risk and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
(Spicer, 1978; Anderson and Frankie, 1980; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; 
Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Freedman and Stagliano, 1981; R. W. Roberts, 
1992) and with social and environmental performance (Mahapatra, 1984; 
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McGuire et al., 1988; Jaggi and Freedmar,, 1992). There is a belief that 
corporate management reduces risk by undertaking social disclosure 
(Trotman and Bradley, 1981) in order to have more stable patterns of stock 
market r~tums (McGuire et al., 1988; R. W. Roberts, 1992). 
It is argued that firms with high systematic risk are relatively less likely to 
afford to act in an environmentally responsible manner Gaggi. and 
Freedman, 1992) than firms with lower risk. Moreover, Spicer (1978) 
concluded that companies with better pollution-control records had lower 
total dsk and systematic risk than less environmentally responsible firms. 
McGuite et al. (1988) concluded "reduction of firm risk as an important 
benefit of social responsibility" (p. 869). Therefore, in this study, it is 
expected that systematic risk will have a negative relation to corporate 
environmental disclosure. Hypothesis H7 is expressed as follows: 
H7: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is negatively 
related to the systematic risk. 
Empirical evidence shows that alternative beta estimatio:" techniques could 
act differently in a variety of markets (Luoma et al., 1994). Two types of beta 
(Ordinary Least Square [OLS] anci. Schole$-Willi,uns [S-W]) are taken into 
account in th.,s study as separate variables to examine their effect on the 
level of disclosure. The reason !S that OLS does not consider thin trading 
phenomenon in both stock and market index whilst S-W will assist in 
estimating beta in the presence of the thin trading phenomena (Australian 
Graduate School of Management [AGSM], 1993b). The above hypothesis can 
be stated in two forms: 
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H71: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is negatively 
related to the systematic risk measured by OLS beta. 
H72: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is negatively 
related to the systematic risk measured by S-W beta. 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
The four variables of size, capital intensity, commercial production and 
independent auditor, are considered as control variables because they may 
intervene other variables and therefore they should be controlled 
(Ullmann, 1985; Cowen et al., 1987; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; R. W. 
Roberts, 1992). R. W. Roberts further noted that they may also represent 
some aspects of stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic 
performance. 
3.3.4.1 Company size 
Company size has been shown in previous research to have explanatory 
power to the extent of social and environmental disclosure. However, 
variable size is associated with environmentally sensitive industries and 
cannot be generalised to industries which are not environmentally 
sensitive (Deegan and Gordon, 1994). Chen and Metcalf {1980) concluded 
that size, as a background factor, influenced the association of corporate 
environmental activities and financial indicators. 
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There are two rationales for selecting firm size as an independent variable. 
First, larger companies are more likely to have greater political visibility or 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Deegan and .Carroll, 1993) and 
they produce environmental disclosure to mitigate political costs (Deegan 
and Gordon, 1994) or political visibility (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989). Second, 
larger firms are more likely to have good environmental activities (Spicer, 
1978; Chen and Metcalf, 1980). 
As mining companies have detrimental effects on the environment 
(Dierkes and Preston, 1977), large mining firms are likely to be scrutinised by 
the general public, government, and environmental interest groups. In 
other words, they have political pressures from public. To avoid claim they 
are destroying the environment, corporate management tend to develop 
environmental policies and strategies and disclose them in the annual 
report. The intention is to show that they do the right thing for the 
environment in order to achieve a sustainable corporation (Elkington, 1994; 
Greeno and Robinson, 1992). Consequently, hypothesis H8 is stated as 
follows: 
H8: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to firm size. 
This study includes both measures, total sales and total assets, and attempts 
to examine another measure of firm size, market capitalisation, that has 
been tested in other accounting research (Wong, 1988). This variable market 
capitalisation has not previously been used in a published study of social 
and environmental accounting disclosure. Thus, it may provide further 
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H81: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the amount of total assets. 
H82: The extent of voluntary environmental disdosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the amount of total sales. 
H83: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the amount of market capitalisation. 
3.3.4.2 Capital Intensity 
Environmental responsiveness of a company requires a large amount of 
expenditure and investment so it requires excellent skills of management in 
order to make the firm profitable (Alexander and Bucholz, 1978). In contrast, 
Vance (1975) r€vealed that socially responsible firms will be at a competitivP 
disadvantage due to the added expense and investment of being socially 
responsible. 
However, it is perceived that investment in equipment for environmental 
protection does not always relate to a decrease in environmental damage. 
This is due to difficulties in differentiating between costs incurred for the 
equipment and improved environmental performance (Christophe and 
Bebbington, 1992). Empirical evidence indicates that oil, iron and steel 
industries spent a considerable amount on pollution control expenditures 
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both as a portion of capital expenditure and as a portion of operating cash 
flow (Mahapatra, 1984). 
Environmentally friendly equipment and technology are becoming of 
interest to stakeholders as they protect the environment (Deegan and 
Gordon, 1994) and provide different claims from stakeholders (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987; McGuire et al, 1988). For example, information relating to 
environmental expenditures, including capital spending, was ranked as one 
of the most important needed by investors (Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992). 
Inevitably, mining companies are required to use environmentally friendly 
machinery and equipment because "sound environmental practice is cost-
effective and, in the long term, enhances a project's capacity to compete 
globally" (O'Neill, 1993, p. 9). Greeno and Robinson (1992) corroborated, in 
the long-term, capital investment in innovative systems may increase 
efficiency and overall profitability. 
From the above discussion, it appears that capital intensity could represent 
some aspects of stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic 
performance. As capital investment can reflect a firm's orientation on the 
environment, the firm will disclose its investment policy to show its 
concerns on the environment. Therefore, it is expected that a positive 
association exists between capital intensity and the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. Hypothesis H9 is stated as follows: 
H9: The extent of voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual 
report of Australian listed mineral mining companies is positively 
related to the capital intensity. 
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3.3.4.3 Independent Auditor 
An environmental audit is performed as part of the external financial audit 
routines due to the growing consciousness of environmental issues 
(Financial Forum, 1994; Carey, 1992; Phillips, 1992; Gray, 1990). Companies 
call for environmental auditors to assess the compliance status on the 
environmental legislation, particularly for environmentally high-risk 
industries, since they realise the tremendous financial and social impact if 
they do not comply (Williams and Phillips, 1994; Kestigian, 1991; Maxwell, 
1990). In addition, the selection of a qualified auditor, such as one of the big 
six accounting firms, provides a signal to the market that the information 
being disclosed is high quality (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992). Therefore, environmental reporting that has been audited 
becomes an important information source to stakeholders (Mastrandonas 
and Strife, 1992). 
The objective of the environmental audit is to provide information that 
enables stakeholders to assess a company's environmental performance as 
weI1 as the corporate achievement to its environmental goals 
(Mastrandonas and Strife, 1992; Tozer and Mathews, 1994). It is expected that 
companies audited by a big six accounting firm are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information. Hypothesis HlO is stated 
as follows: 
HlO: Australian listed mineral mining companies audited by a big six audit 
firm are more likely to make voluntary environmental disclosure in 
their annual report. 
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3.3.4.4 Commercial Production 
It is possible that some nuneral mining companies may be merely carrying 
out exploration and other companies are actively drilling and extracting 
minerals from the earth. Clearly, extracting companies are more likely to 
have an adverse effect on the environment. Commercial production means 
that a company has extracted crude minerals and might need to process 
them further in order to market the product to customers. Thus, firms that 
are in commercial production are likely to deplete natural resources and be 
more detrimental to the environment than non-commercial firms. 
This variable has not been tested in prior studies. It is expected in this study 
that commercial operations are associated with voluntary environmental 
disclosure. Hypothesis Hll is stated as follows: 
Hll: The voluntary environmental disclosure in the annual report of 
Australian listed mineral mining companies is likely to be related to 
a commercial operation. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, three dimensions of stakeholder theory, as developed by 
Ullmann (1985), are elaborated upon to explain the incidence of 
environmental disclosure. Explanatory variables relevant to this study and 
the research hypotheses were developed in the framework of the three 
dimensions of stakeholder theory. The research procedure, variable 
measurement and data analysis are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter4 
RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the research design and 
procedures adopted to achieve the purpose of the study. Based on the 
literature review and stakeholder theoretical framework discussed in 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 respectively, it is posited that certain firm 
characteristics will be associated with the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure by Australian listed mineral mining companies 
in their 1993 annual report. 
4.2 Sample Selection 
The sample frame of the study is Australian mineral mining companies 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The sample was selected 
from the microfiche Annual Report File of the Australian Graduate School 
of Management (AGSM) at Edith Cowan University, Churchlands campus 
library. The AGSM File consists of the top 500 listed companies in Australia 
by market capitalisation. 
The process of selecting the sample was conducted in two phases. First, 
mineral mining companies listed in the ASX Journal June and December 
1993 editions were used as references to determine the sample. Second, 
firms listed in the ASX Journal were matched with the firms in the AGSM 
File. The following table describes the number of firms included in the 
sample. 
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Table4.1 
Sample of the Study 
Number of mining firms listed on Australian Stock Exchange 386 
Number of firms not listed on the AGSM Annual Report File lli 
Number of mining firms listed on the AGSM Annual Report File 135 
Number of Oil & Gas firms (excluded) ..fil. 
Number of sample firms in the study 104 
The rationale for including mineral mining firms is that these companies 
are drilling, extracting and depleting natural resources and this may have 
adverse effects on the environment. Consequently, it is important to 
investigate the likelihood of the companies to voluntarily disclose 
environmental activities in their annual report. 
To maintain homogeneity in the samplE>, oil & gas firms were excluded as 
they are using different equipment and t~chnology. Also, one mineral 
mining firm that has oil activities (Pancontinental company) was excluded 
from the sample. The mineral mining firms in the sample are listed in 
Appendix A. 
4.3 Data Collection 
The 1993 annual reports were used as the source to extract environmental 
information as they are the latest reports available in the AGSM Annual 
Report File at the time of the study. The information extracted from the 
annual reports was noted in a scoring sheet that is provided in Appendix C. 
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This included environmental disclosure; financial year-end; total sales; total 
assets; total debt; total plant assets; total ordinary shares; net income before 
income tax and extraordinary items; net income after income tax and 
extraordinary items; percentage of ordinary shares held by the top 20 
shareholders; auditor namei the presence of corporate environmental 
committee; and commercial production. The 1992 annual reports were also 
used to extract data on total assets, total debt, total ordinary shares, net 
income before income tax and extraordinary items and net income after 
income tax and extraordinary items. 
Beta and market capitalisation were taken from the 1993 Risk Measurement 
Service (RMS) published quarterly by the AGSM. When data collection was 
undertaken, the latest publication of the betas was September 1993. 
Therefore betas for December 1993 were not reflected in the systematic risk 
of the firms that have December year-end. This would constrain the study 
particularly in relation to the magnitude of systematic risk for those 
companies with a December year-end. Table 4.2 provides financial year-end 
of firms included in the study. 
As five companies had financial statements expressed in their home-
country currencies, it is necessary to convert them to Australian currency. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin for January 1994 was adopted as a 
reference in determining the relevant end-of-month exchange rates. This 
publication is preferred as the Reserve Bank is formally entitled to release 
exchange rates prevailing throughout Australia. However, as the Reserve 
Bank Bulletin did not provide all of the required exchange rates, missing 
rates were obtained from the Australian Financial Review. 
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Table4.2 
Firms' Financial Year-End 
Year-End 
January 31 
March 31 
May31 
June 30 
July 31 
December 31 
Total 
No. of Companies 
1 
1 
1 
69 
2 
~ 
104 
The 1994 annual report of the Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) 
contained a list of the members of the Council. This report was used to 
check which firms in the sample are members of the Council. 
4.4 Measures of Voluntary Disclosure: Dependent Variables 
Several different index systems have been adopted in prior studies to 
measure the extent of voluntary disclosure. These include the number of 
words (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990; Deegan and Gordon, 1994), a dichotomous 
index (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Kelly, 1981; Cooke, 1989; Ness and Mirza, 
1991), the importance of information items (Buzby, 1974; Firth, 1978; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Coy et al., 1993), 
number of pages (Cowen et al., 1987; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Maheshwari, 
1992; Patten, 1992; Gibson and. O'Donovan, 1994), number of lines (Bowman 
and Haire, 1976; Trotman and Bradley, 1981), number of sentences (Ingram 
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and Frazier, 1980), and the specificity of items (Wiseman, 1982; Freedman 
and Wasley, 1990). 
In this study, indexing methods using word index, unweighted index and 
weighted index are applied. It is advisable to undertake weighted and 
unweighted indices in one study in order to see the effect of the weighting 
on the ranking of companies (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The following 
sections outline the indexing procedures applied in the current study. 
4.4.1 Identifying Environmental Disclosure Items 
By referring to prior studies (for example, Trotman and Bradley, 1981; 
Wiseman, 1982; Cowen et al., 1987; Deegan and Gordon, 1994) and a review 
of a random sample of ten corporate annual reports, a list of 22 
environmental items was generated. The checklist was constructed to 
measure the quantity of non-mandatory environmental information. To 
ensure the homogeneity of the items (Marston and Shrives, 1991), the 22 
items were classified into four categories: corporate environmental policy (7 
items), recognition of environmental activities (2 items), prevention or 
repair of environmental damage (10 items), and environmental liabilities (3 
items). A senior academic and an honours student wert asked to review the 
environmental items and their classifications into the four categories. They 
confirmed the 22 items and their classifications. The environmental items 
for each category are included in Appendix B. 
This checklist was then used to score the items based on three indices. The 
three indices and the procedure for constructing those indices are discussed 
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in subsection 4.4.3. The inclusion of three indices allows us to determine 
which dependent variable best fits the extent of disclosure. 
4.4.2 Rating the Importance of Environmental Disclosure Items 
The degree of relative importance of environmental items as rated by 
financial analysts was used to develop a weighted index. Only one user 
group, Financial Analysts, was selected because it was impractical to ask the 
relative importance of environmental information items of all 
stakeholders. It is noted that "one class of user will attach different weights 
to an item of disclosure than another class of user" (Cooke, 1989, p. 197). 
However, financial analysts often use the annual report (Anderson and 
Epstein, 1995) for making financial assessment, investment decisions and 
for advising other user groups. For these reasons it is considered that 
financial analysts are "the most 'sophisticated users' " (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991, p. 202). Consequently, their views are considered appropriate 
for the purpose of this study. 
The ASX Members' Directory for 1994/1995 was used as a reference to 
distribute the questionnaires. There are 259 organizations that are members 
of the ASX and these organizations comprise 87 different securities and 
stockbroking firms. A questionnaire, consisted of 22 factors and generated 
on a random factorial design which resulted in 24 modPls, was sent to all 
members, addressed to the Research Department of the respondents, with a 
covering letter and a reply paid envelope. They were asked to score the 22 
items such that the overall score for the items equals 100. The questionnaire 
and the mean values of the weighted scores for each item are presented in 
Appendix B. 
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A total of 37 responses were received from the respondents, and 21 replies 
were usable yielding a 24 percent response rate. One questionnaire was 
returned unopened and eieven firms sent back unanswered questionnaires. 
Seven firms returned incomplete or incorrect scores resulting in a total 
score of more or less than 100. However, three of the questionnaires with a 
score of greater than 100 (e.g., 103) were weighted to 100 and the remainder 
were treated as unusable. Mean values of the scores from the financial 
analysts were calculated and the means were used as the weights of the 
items for the weighting disclosure index. Fowler (1993) contended that 
credible statistics results will be obtained if the response rate is not lower 
than 20 per cent. 
The three indices of disclosure included in this study were treated as 
separate dependent variables to examine which dependent variable best fits 
the extent of environmental disclosure. The procedure of scoring the 
disclosures is explained in subsection 4.4.3. 
4.4.3 Disclosure Scoring Method 
A scoring sheet was prepared which included three indices being applied. In 
addition to total score, each category of disclosure items is also added to 
obtain a score for each category of environmental information. A summary 
of indexing procedures is described in Table 4.3 and the scoring sheet for 
calculating the indices is provided in Appendix C. 
The advantage of an unweighted index is that misranking of disclosure 
items can be avoided because the items are treated equally (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). However, treatment of equal importance regardless of the 
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quality of each disclosure item is perceived to be a deficiency of this index 
(Coy et al., 1991). 
The benefits of a weighted index are that it identifies items that possess 
greater usefulness (Freedman and Jaggi, 1986), and that it recognises the 
relative importance of the items (Coy et al., 1993). Even though the 
Table4.3 
Indexing Procedure 
Method 
1. Word Index 
2. Unweighted Index 
3. Weighted Index 
Procedure 
a. Calculate individual words or numbers 
relevant to the selected environmental 
items. 
b. Numbers are converted into words. 
c. The amount of environmental 
disclosures (total and subtotals) 
is additive based on the actual items 
being disclosed. 
a. Score '1' for the presence of an environ-
mental item and score 'O' for the 
absence. 
b. Total and subtotal index is calculated 
as actual disclosures being made. 
a. Each item is weighted on the basis of 
the relative degree of importance. 
b. The weights of the items is the 
average scores of all scores given by 
financial analysts. 
c. Total and subtotal index score for each 
company is calculated by summing 
weights of overall and subgroups 
actual items being disclosed. 
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weighted index has often been used in accounting research, it has some 
drawbacks. For example, unclear theoretical justification for the weighting, 
subjective element on weighting system, and attachment of different 
weights for different users (Freedman and J aggi, 1986; Marston iind Shrives, 
1991). To avoid having such shortcomings, Coy et al. (1993) suggested 
discriminating between poor and excellent disclosure. However, this 
discrimination is irrelevant because companies that are better at disclosing 
'important items' are also better at disclosing 'less important items' (Spero 
cited in Cooke, 1989 and Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
In summary, each index has its strengths and weaknesses to measure the 
amount and type of disclosure. Different approaches underlying the scoring 
procedures have implications in calculating the magnitude of disclosure. 
Unweighted index is more favourable because it is less subjective than 
others. It is expected the application of different indices in one study would 
provide evidence as to which index best fits the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. 
4.5 Independent Variables 
Eleven explanatory variables are tested in this study. Hypotheses based on 
these variables have been discussed and developed in chapter 3. In this 
section measurement of each variable will be discussed. A summary of the 
measures is presented in Table 4.4. 
(1) Ownership Diffusion (OWN) 
This variable is defined a:, the percentage of outstanding ordinary shares 
held by the top 20 shareholders of the firm. 1bis measure is used because it 
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delineates concentration of the ownership. It differs from the measurement 
used in earlier studies: oil firms that affiliated with the Alyeska Pipeline 
Service company (Patten, 1992) and the percentage of ordinary shares owned 
by management and other individuals (R. W. Roberts, 1992). 
(2) Operating Leverage (LEV) 
This variable is measured by a variety of methods. Leverage is defined as 
sales minus variable costs divided by sales minus variable costs minus fixed 
costs (McGuire et al., 1988), total debt divided by total assets (Belkaoui and 
Karpik, 1989), and average debt divided by total equity (R. W. Roberts, 1992). 
In this study, the leverage is calculated as by Belkaoui and Karpik (1989); that 
is, total debt divided by total assets. Past and current year of leverage are 
used in this study which is identical with McGuire et al. (1988). 
(3) Political Pressure (PRES) 
The presence of political pressure has not previously been used to estimate 
the extent of environmental disclosure. However, it is desirable since 
environmental disclosure is exercised to reduce political visibility or 
political costs (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Deegan and Gordon, 1994; Gibson 
and O'Donovan, 1994). PRES is a dummy variable to describe whether or 
not the firm is a member of AMIC; score "one" for member firm of the 
AMIC and "zero" for non-member firm. 
(4) Environmental Responsibility Committee (ENCO) 
The presence of a corporate environmental responsibility committee 
(ENCO) is treated as a dummy variable. A score of "one"' is awarded to 
companies that indicate they have a committee and "zero" if they do not 
mention the existence of an environmental responsibility committee. 
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Table4.4 
Variable Definitions 
Variables 
Dependent variables 
Expected 
sign 
1. ENDIS1: Word Index n.a. 
2. END!Si: Unweighted 
Index n.a. 
3. ENDIS3: Weighted 
Index n.a. 
Independent Variables 
Stakeholder Power 
1. OWN ( - ) 
2. LEV ( + ) 
3.PRES ( +) 
Strategic Posture 
1. ENCO ( +) 
Economic Performance 
1.ROA ( +) 
2.ROE ( + ) 
3. RISK (-) 
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Measures 
Number of Words 
1= the presence of environmental 
disclosure, and O=otherwise 
The mean relative importance of 
environmental information items 
Percentage of ordinary shares held 
by the top twenty shareholders. 
Total debt to total assets 1992 & 1993. 
Membership of the Australian 
Mining Industry Council: 
1 = member; 0 = non member. 
The presence of Environmental 
Responsibility Committee = 1; 
otherwise = 0. 
Net income before tax and extraordi-
nary items to total assets 1992 & 1993. 
Net income after tax and extraordi-
nary items to total ordinary shares 
1992 & 1993. 
OLS and S-W Beta of a firm's 
security. 
Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Variable Definitions 
Variables 
Control Variables 
1. SIZE 
2. CAPINT 
3.AUD 
4.COM 
Expected 
sign 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( + ) 
( +) 
(5) Return on assets (ROA) 
Measures 
Total assets, market capitalisation, 
and natural log of total sales. 
Gross plant assets to total sales 1993. 
The big six accounting firms = 1; 
non big six accounting firms= 0. 
Commercial production = 1; 
otherwise = 0. 
Consistent with McGuire et al. (1988), Belkaoui and Karpik (1989), 
Maheshwari (1992), Jaggi and Freedman (1992), the variable ROA is 
calculated by dividing net income before income tax and extraordinary 
items by total assets. This measure takes account of prior period (1992) and 
current period (1993). 
(6) Return on equity (ROE) 
As with Bowman and Haire (1976), Spicer (1978), Cowen et al. (1987), Jaggi 
and Freedman (1992) and R. W. Roberts (1992), the measure used for ROE is 
obtained oy dividing net income after income tax and extraordinary items by 
total ordinary shares. Similar to ROA, this measure takes account of prior 
period (1992) and current period (1993). 
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(7) Systematic risk (RISK) 
This variable is defined as the contribution of the individual security to 
portfolio and is measured by the security's beta. Two types of betas, OLS and 
5-W, are applied in this study. These measures were quoted from the RMS 
published by the AGSM edition of September 1993, which was the latest 
publication available. 
(8) Firm size (SIZE) 
Two measures of SIZE have been used in previous studies in social and 
environmental disclosure: total assets (Spicer, 1978; Trotman and Bradley, 
1981; Maheshwari, 1992} and total sales (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; R. W. 
Roberts, 1992; Patten, 1992}. Those variables have been shown to have 
significant explanatory power and they will be adopted in this study. 
However, the natural log of total sales is considered in this study because 
total sales has a non-linear relation to the extent of environmental 
disclosure. Market capitalisation is also included as an additional measure 
of SIZE. 
(9) Capital Intensity (CAPINT) 
CAPINT is measured by the ratio of gross plant assets to total sales. This is 
consistent with the measure used by Soliman (1989). 
(10) Independent Auditors (AUD) 
AUD is a dummy variable to describe whether the firm is audited by the Big 
Six accounting firms. Score "one" represents firms that are audited by the 
Big Six accounting firms and score "zero" for firms that are not. 
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(11) Commeicial Production (COM) 
COM represents whether the firm is a commercial operation. Thus, COM is 
a dummy variable: score "one" for commercial firms and score "zero" for 
non-commercial firms. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
Diverse indices are adopted in this study and each index is treated as a 
separate dependent variable. Each type of index is applied to measure the 
extent of total voluntary environmental disclosure and four categories of 
voluntary environmental disclosure. 
Different measures for RISK (OLS and S-W) and SIZE (total assets, n log 
total sales, and market capitalisation) are taken separately into regression 
models. In addition, LEV, ROA and ROE in two periods (1992 and 1993) are 
included to see the effect of those variables on the extent of disclosure. 
Univariate analysis is not performed in the current study. Data analysis is 
undertaken by using multiple regression analysis. The reason is that an 
independent variable found to be significant in univariate analysis might 
become insignificant when combined with other variables in multivariate 
analysis due to interactions between the variables in the multiple regression 
model (Pokorny, 1991, p.126). Therefore, even though the hypotheses 
developed could be tested by univariate analysis, this model is unrealistic 
because it simply takes account of one independent variable (predictor) in 
the model (Pokorny, 1991, p. 124). Clearly, this study, which includes fifteen 
dependent variables (total and categories of disclosure) and twelve models 
of different independent variables, would be inefficient if rui1ning 
univariate statistics. In most instances the prediction of the dependent 
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variable (e.g., the incidence of environmental disclosure) can be improved 
by using more than one variable (Doran, 1989, p. 63). Given this, the extent 
of environmental disclosure could be regarded as a function of several 
explanatory variables. 
Consequently, a multiple regression analysis is chosen for the current study 
since the voluntary disclosure of environmental activities can be affected by 
a number of differential factors. The benefits of multiple regression analysis 
are: (1) to predict a single dependent variable from the knowledge of more 
than one independent variable; (2) to provide an objective means of 
assessing the predictive power of explanatory variables; and (3) to improve 
the prediction of dependent variable (Hair et al., 1995, p. 93, 98). Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis is performed. The reason is 
that the majority of independent variables (SIZE, ROA, ROE, CAPINT, 
OWN and LEV) are either ratio or continuous variables and all of the 
dependent variables are additive. The remaining four variables (ENCO, 
PRES, AUD and COM) are treated as dummy variables. The multiple 
regression model is constructed as follows: 
where 
ENDIS (Ti) = Bo + 81 OWN + 82 LEV (yi) + 83 PRES + 84 ENCO + Bs 
ROA (yi) + 86 ROE (yi) + 87 RISK (a-b) + 8s SIZE (1-3) + 89 
CAPINT + 810 AUD + 811 COM + ei 
ENDIS {Ti) is the dependent variable taking total or categories of volun-
Bo 
fsn 
X (yi) 
X (a-b) 
tary environmental disclosure measured by each index 
is a constant value 
represents the coefficient of predictive variables 
represents the variable in year 1992 and 1993 
alternative measures of beta 
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X (1-3) alternative continuous variables (total assets, total sales and 
market capitalisation) 
a residual value 
As five independent variables (SIZE, LEV, ROA, ROE and RISK) have 
alternative measures, they are taken separately into the multiple regression 
models in order to avoid having multicollinearity. Alternative 
combinations of these variables result in twelve sets of explanatory 
variables as presented in Table 4.5. Consequently, there are sixty multiple 
regression models for each group of dependent variables and a total of 180 
models to be examined in this study. 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, sample selection, data collection, definitions of the relevant 
variables, indexing procedures and statistical method are elaborated. The 
results are tabulated and discussed in the next chapter. The existing 
statistical problems from the data and OLS multiple regression analyses will 
also be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Table4.5. 
Alternative Sets of Explanatory Variables 
Model 1 
ENDJS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + bz LnLEV92 + b3 PRFS + "4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + b7 
SqrtOLS + bg LnMARCAP + bg LnCAPINT + bto AUD+ b11 COM+ ej 
Model 2 
ENDJS (Ti)= bo + bt Sqrt0WN + bz LnLEV92 + b3 PRFS + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + h7 
SqrtOLS + bg LnSALES + bg LnCAPINT + b10 AUD + b11 COM + ej 
Model 3 
ENDIS (fi.) = bo + b1 SqrtOWN + bz LnLEV92 + b3 PRFS + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + h7 
SqrtOLS + bg LnASSETS + bg LnCAPINT + blQ AUD + b11 COM + ej 
Model 4 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + b1 SqrtOWN + bz LnLEV92 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + h7 
LnSW + bg LnASSETS + bg LnCAPINf + blQ AUD + b11 COM + ei 
Model 5 
ENDIS (f i) = bo + b1 SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV92 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + b7 
LnSW + bg LnSALF.5 + bg LnCAPINf + blQ AUD+ b11 COM + ei 
Model 6 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + b1 SqrtOWN + bz LnLEV92 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA92 + b6 LnROE92 + b7 
LnSW + bg LnMARCAP + bg LnCAPINf + b10 AUD + b11 COM + ej 
Model 7 
ENDIS (Tj) = bo + b1 SqrtOWN + bz LnLEV93 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCOi + b5 LnROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
LnSW + bg LnMARCAP + b9 LnCAPINT + blQ AUD + b11 COM+ ej 
Model 8 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV93 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
LnSW + bg LnSALF.5 + bg LnCAPINf + btO AUD + b11 COM + ei 
Model 9 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV93 + b3 PRESi + b4 ENCO + b5 LnROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
LnSW + bg LnASSETS + bg LnCAPINT + btO AUD+ bu COM + ej 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Alternative Sets of Explanatory Variables 
Model 10 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV93 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCOj + b5 LnROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
SqrtOLS + bs LnASSETS + bg LnCAPINf + blQ AUD + b11 COM + ~ 
Model 11 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV93 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + bs LnROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
SqrtOLS + bs LnSALE.S + bg LnCAPINf + bto AUD + bt t COM + E!i 
Model 12 
ENDIS (Ti) = bo + bt SqrtOWN + b2 LnLEV93 + b3 PRES + b4 ENCO + b5 Ln.ROA93 + b6 LnROE93 + b7 
SqrtOLS + bs LnMARCAP + bg LnCAPINT + b10 AUD+ bn COM + ej 
ENDIS (Ti) = the extent of environmental disclosure for each type of 
indices 
OWN = the largest percentage of ordinary shares held by the top 
twenty shareholders 
LEV = total debt/total assets year 1992 and 1993 
PRES = membership of the Australian Mining Industry Council: 
l=member, O=non member 
ENCO = l=the existence of Corporate Environmental Committee; 
0= otherwise 
ROA = net income before income tax and extraordinary items/total 
assets year 1992 and 1993 
ROE = net income after income tax and extraordinary items/ total 
ordinary shares year 1992 and 1993 
RISK = beta of a firm's security for 1993 in OLS and 5-W versions 
SIZE = total assets, nahlral log of total sales, market capitalization 
for 1993 
CAPINT = gross plant assets/total sales for 1993 
AUD = 1= the big six accounting firms; 0= non-big accounting firms 
MARCAP = market capitalization 
COM = commercial production 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 
RESULTS 
It was cited earlier that the objective of this study is to investigate the 
relationship of firm-specific characteristics and the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosures with respect to total disclosure and categories of 
voluntary environmental disclosure. 
In this context, OLS multiple regression analysis was used to examine the 
correlations between 12 models of explanatory variables and the extent of 
corporate voluntary environmental disclosures, either in terms of total or 
categories, on the basis of three indices. All these tests were run with SPSS 
Statistical data analysis. 
All relevant data have been collected to test the incidence of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. Thirty-eight firms (37%) from the sample 
provide no voluntary environmental disclosure. Several firms that made 
environmental disclosure did not have certain variables: RISK (2 firms), 
OWN (1 firm), and OWN and RISK (1 firm) and these firms were ignored 
in the analysis. This resulted in 62 firms which were included in the 
sample. 
This chapter elaborates on the results of statistical analyses that consist of 
descriptive and multivariate statistics. Statistical problems of the data and 
their solution are also presented. Finally, a discussion of the results on the 
extent of disclosure and stakeholder framework are reported in this chapter. 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Initially, descriptive statistics were calculated to examine estimations of 
central tendency and the distribution of variables for the mean, standard 
deviation, kurtosis, and skewness. The median value was obtained from the 
results of one-sample test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S). Descriptive 
statistics of raw data for both dependent and independent variables are 
shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
According to Pagano (1990, p. 8-9), descriptive statistics merely provide a 
general description about the observed data. To do further analysis, such as 
multivariate analysis, it is necessary to examine whether the variables meet 
the assumptions underlying multivariate analysis; those are normality, 
linearity, independence of error, non-collinearity and constant variance of 
the error terms (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). These 
problems will be discussed further in the next section. 
From Table 5.1. and Table 5.2, it is apparent that the raw data for both 
dependent and independent variables depart from the normal distribution. 
With the exception of OWN, ROA92, ROA93, and ROE93 that were skewed 
to the right (negative skewness), the independent variables were 
significantly skewed to the left (positive skewness). Therefore, the 
distributions departed from normality. 
According to Pokorny (1991, p. 94), the nature of the distribution of 
independent variables will reflect the nature of error term distribution. In 
inferential statistics, meeting the normality of error term distribution is 
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TableS.1 
Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables 
(n=104) 
Variables Ra~ I2ata Itsllliformed 12am 
Mean Median SD Kurtosis Skewness Mean Median SD Kurtosis Skewness 
Words! 43.933 0 94.468 8.908 2.913 1.788 1.756 0.500 -0.968 0.039 
Words2 7.923 0 24.053 20.483 4.258 1.578 1.568 0.298 -0.124 0.728 
Words3 76.260 0 210.104 53.267 6.533 2.073 2.090 0.449 0.649 0.006 
Words4 9.000 0 36.703 46.083 6.342 1.619 1.654 0.421 0.000 0.494 
Wordstot 137.115 0 317.495 29.801 4.745 2.125 2.111 0.556 -0.408 -0.085 
00 Unwgtl 0.962 0 1.576 2.073 1.733 0.193 0.000 0.271 -0.264 1.068 
t)l Unwgt2 0.173 0 0.405 4.072 2.192 0.051 0.000 0.117 2.209 1.959 
Unwgt3 1.115 0 1.834 5.533 2.126 0.212 0.000 0.292 -0.466 0.963 
Unwgt4 0.125 0 0.332 3.359 2.301 0.038 0.000 0.100 3.3593 2.301 
Unwgtot 2.375 0 3.700 3.368 1.887 0.330 0.000 0.393 -0.843 0.761 
Wgtl 4.926 0 7.963 1.535 1.622 0.413 0.000 0.543 -1.155 0.737 
Wgt2 0.554 0 1.298 4.117 2.202 0.104 0.000 0.238 1.781 1.901 
Wgt3 5.487 0 8.896 4.845 1.999 1.097 1.140 0.244 -0.237 0.056 
Wgt4 0.576 0 1.486 3.641 2.299 0.097 0.000 0.247 2.951 2.200 
Wgttot 11.542 0 17.458 2.610 1.726 0.617 0.000 0.679 -1.507 0.409 
co 
°' 
Table 5.2. 
Descriptive Statistks: Independent Variables 
(n=104) 
Variables E.i!W I2ll1i! 
Mean Median SD Kurtosis Skewness Mean 
ASSETS 4.07E+08 71820575 l.06E+09 .. 5.608 17.997 
CAPINT 107.291 60.350 210.775 55.889 6737 4.330 
LEV92 43.524 32.985 61.813 54.860 6.725 3.308 
LEV93 45.827 28.375 94.523 56.165 7.059 3.203 
MARCAP 4.49E+08 90000000 1.20E+09 .. 5.262 18.354 
OLS 1.283 1.200 0.911 9.319 1.596 2.034 
OWN 76.841 79.245 14.776 0.831 -0.859 4.381 
ROA92 -7.479 3.225 84.528 73.169 -7.720 6.680 
ROA93 -1.589 2.085 27.617 9.233 -2.540 4.895 
ROE92 30.067 6.890 130.467 19.439 3.082 6.066 
ROE93 25.647 3.615 95.087 12.288 1.217 5.931 
SALES 2.32E+08 34782025 6.70E+08 51.708 6.513 17.910 
S-W 1.572 1.395 1.035 4.286 1.475 1.071 
• Figure is not available from the analysis 
AUD Number of Companies audited by one of the big six accounting firms (1) = 83 
Number of Companies not audited by one of the big six accounting firms (0) = 21 
COM Number of Commercial Companies (1) = 104; non-commercial companies (0) = 0 
ENCO Number of Companies have Environmental Committee (1) = 7 
Number of Companies have no Environmental Committee (0) = 97 
PRES Number of Companies member of AMIC (1) = 31 
Number of Companies not member of AMIC (0) = 73 
ImruzfQrmed Data 
Median SD Kurtosis Skewness 
18.090 2.055 -0.364 0.009 
4.418 1.077 1.046 -0.292 
3.508 1.097 2.117 -1.112 
3.346 1.135 2.549 -0.730 
18.315 1.804 -0.374 0.156 
2.025 0.219 7.949 0.159 
4.415 1.654 -0.431 -0.037 
6.670 0.081 51.387 5.456 
4:.884 0.176 5.065 1.253 
6.106 0.208 12.131 -2.144 
6.002 0.256 14.264 -2.775 
17.790 1.814 -0.286 0.122 
1.063 0.321 1.171 -0.026 
essential (Hair et al., 1995; Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989). Thus, there is an 
indication of statistical problems arising in the observed data in this study. 
5.3 Statistical Problems 
Satisfying the five assumptions: normality, linearity, independence of error, 
non collinearity and constant variance of the error terms, are imperative in 
multivariate analysis. In addition, outliers (that is extreme vaiues or 
influential values from observations) must be resolved in order to not 
influence normality and linearity of the observations (Stevens, 1992, p. 107). 
A casewise plot was performed to detect linearity and the presence of 
outliers in multivariate analysis. It was found that outliers existed in the 
observed data and that linearity of the residuals was violated. 
There are four ways to eliminate outliers; these are, to correct data entry, to 
specify missing value codes in computer control language, to delete the 
outliers, and to change the value on variable(s) (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1989). Stevens (1992) suggests to delete ~ome or all of the outliers from the 
analysis or to adopt robust regression techniques. However, Huber (cited in 
Stevens, 1992) contends that a robust regression may be less effective if 
outliers are in the space of the predictors. Data transformations is a 
favourable way to reduce outliers as well as to improve the analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989; Stevens, 1992). 
Graphical and non-graphical tests can be used to check the normality of the 
observed data (Stevens, 1992). The graphical test was performed by a normal 
probability plot and K-S test to examine the normal distribution of each of 
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the dependent and independent variables. It is argued that, in the non-
graphical test, "the combination of usins skewness and kurtosis coefficient 
and the Shapiro-Wilk test were the most powerful in detecting departures 
from normality" (Stevens, 1992, p. 253). Unfortunately, the Shapiro-Wilk 
statistics could not be run in this study because it is limited to a sample size 
not more than 50 (Norusis, 1990, p. 122). Therefore, the K-S test and 
examination of skewness and kurtosis coefficient were performed to see if 
the observed data are from a population having the theoretical distribution 
{Siegel and Castelan, 1988). 
An examination of the skewness and kurtosis coefficients and K-S test was 
done for each of the dependent and independent variables. As noted earlier, 
all of the dependent and almost all of the indepencient variables departed 
from normal distributions. Hair et al. (1995) suggest "if the variations from 
the normal distribution is sufficiently large, all resulting statistical tests are 
invalid ... " (p. 64). Thus, it is necessary to remedy for non-normality by 
conducting transformation (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989; Hair et al., 1995). 
Similarly, the assumptions relating to homoscedasticity and independence 
of the error term were violated. Standardized and studentized residuals 
(through scatterplot and histogram) were performed to detect 
homoscedasticity of the residuals. Homoscedasticity indicates the constant 
variance of errors terms of a variable (Hair, et al., 1995; Neter et al., 1990, p. 
247-248). The Durbin-Watson test was undertaken to detect the 
independence of error terms (Neter et al., 1990, p. 248). This is to ascertain if 
the time dimension of data has impact on the normality of distribution 
(Norusis, 1990, p. 260). The violation of these assumptions can be overcome 
by transformation {Stevens, 1992, p. 96). 
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Collinearity occurs if there is an interrelation between two or more 
predictor variables. The presence of multicollinearity would cause, to limit 
size of regression coefficient, the existence of heteroscedasticity, and 
difficulties in determining the importance of a predictor (Stevens, 1992). 
This problem will be explained further in subsection 5.5.1. 
5.4 Transformation of Data 
Transformations were performed for both dependent and independent 
variables. Table 5.3 describes the transformations undertaken for each 
variable. From the results of descriptive statistics for the raw data on the 
dependent and independent variables in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, it appears 
that the distributions are not normal. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) suggest 
the following: 
If the distribution differs moderately from normal, a 
square root transformation is tried first. If the distribution 
differs substantially, a log transformation is tried. If the 
distribution differs severely, the inverse is tried. (p. 84) 
As the distributions of the observed data for dependent variables are 
substantially positive skewed, a logarithm transformation was employed. 
Prior to the transformations, as a consequence of the presence of a 
considerable number of zero values in WORDS, UWGT, and WGT, one was 
added to get a minimum value of one for each variable. The reason is that 
zero values cannot be transformed by a log, and log one wil! yield zero. K-S 
test was run again to examine the normality. The transformation resulted 
in closer mean and median values, therefore, skewness was reduced 
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Table5.3 
Data Transformation 
Variable Transformation 
Dependent Variables 
Words_l log 10 
Words_2 log 10 
Words_3 loglO 
Words_4 loglO 
Wordstot log 10 
Unwgt_l loglO 
Unwgt_2 loglO 
Unwgt_3 log 10 
Unwgt_4 log 10 
Unwgtot log 10 
Wgt_l log 10 
Wgt_2 log 10 
Wgt_3 log 10 
Wgt_4 log 10 
Wgttot log 10 
Independent Variables 
Capint natural log 
Lev92 natural log 
Lev93 natural log 
RISK (OLS) square root 
RISK (S-W) natural log 
ROA92 natural log 
ROA93 natural log 
ROE92 natural log 
ROE93 natural log 
Assets natural log 
Marcap natural log 
OWN square root 
90 
significantly and the distributions were closer to normal (see Table 5.1). 
All explanatory variabies, except for the dummy variables AUD, ENCO, and 
PRES were transformed. Variable COM was taken out from the analysis 
because all the companies observed have a commercial operation. From the 
descriptive analysis of the raw data (Table 5.2.) and the results of the K-S test, 
it was found that four variables (OWN, ROA92, ROA93 and ROE93) were 
negatively skewed and the remaining variables were positively skewed. 
Transformations were performed on the variables depending on the extent 
and type of skewness. 
Before transformation, variables that were observed as having negative 
values (ROA, ROE, RISK [OLS] and RISK [S-W]) were assigned a minimum 
value of one because it is not possible to take a log and a square root with a 
negative score (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989, p. 85-86). This was done by 
finding the variable with the largest negative value and then adding one 
more than the negative value. This pro,;:edure yielded a natural logarithmic 
measure of zero or square root of one (Deegan and Carroll, 1993). A square-
root transformation was applied to OWN and RISK (OLS), whilst a natural-
logarithm transformation was employ~d to MARCAP, ASSETS, CAPINT, 
SALES, ROA, ROE, RISK (S-W), and LEV. 
A K-S one-sample test was undertaken again to check the normality of the 
transformed data and this indicated that the distributions were normal. In 
addition, there was no outlier found in the predictive models. The results of 
the descriptive analysis of transformed data for dependent and independent 
variables are presented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. 
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5.5 Results of Multivariate Analysis 
5.5.1 Test of Multicollinearity 
A problem that may arise in multivariate analysis is the presence of 
multicollinearity. Its existence can create severe constraints on the 
regression coefficient (Stevens, 1992). More specifically, Pokorny (1991) 
concluded that multicollinearity affects the variances of parameter 
estimators that will reduce the precision of these estimators, lower the t-
statistics and reduce their statistical significance (p. 148). Thus this problem 
must be resolved to maintain the quality and stability of the model 
developed. 
The first step in detecting the existence of multicollinearity was to perform 
Pearson Correlation Matrices for the twelve models of independent 
variables. Appendix D, which contains correlation matrices of the twelve 
regression models shown in Table 4.5, indicates the correlc1iivn.s do not 
contain a harmful level of multicollinearity. The correlation coefficients in 
the twelve models are less than 0.60.1 
However, to ensure these results, another test should be performed. Hair et 
al. (1995) argue that "Lack of any high correlation values does not ensure a 
lack of collinearity. Collinearity may be due to the combined effect of two or 
more other independent variables" (p. 127). Tolerance is a good way to 
assess multicollinearity because it can detect multicollinearity that is callSed 
by the interaction of two or more variables (Brown, 1991, p. 114). 
1 Accordiug to Farrar and Gaulber (1967), harmful Ttiulticollinearity is not present until 
bivariate correlations reach 0.8 or 0.9. 
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Furthermore, Brown (1991) contends that if tolerance coefficient is nearly 
zero high collinearity exists, but if the tolerance coefficient approaches one, 
the chance of multicollinearity is small. 
Moreover, multicollinearity can also be detected from the magnitude of 
vai.'iance inflation factor (VIF) for the variables. It is the reciprocal of 
tolerance (Hair et al., 1995, p. 127; Norusis, 1990, p. 288). Myers (cited in 
Stevens, 1992) reveals that " ... [if] any VIF exceeds 10, there is reason for at 
least some concern; then one should consider deletion or an alternative to 
least square estimation to combat the problem" (p. 77). 
In this study, tolerance test was undertaken for all regression models and 
the results of this test are tabulated only for models with the highest 
adjusted R2 for three indices. It was found that all tolerance coefficients2 for 
the explanatory variables are near to one and their VIFs are less than 10. It 
means that multicollinearity is not present in the multiple regression 
models developed. 
5.5.2 Multivariate Statistic~ 
There are 15 different dependent variables with respect to total and 
categories of disclosure and twelve models of predictors in this study. The 
combinations of those variables produce one P'.lndred and eighty multiple 
regression models tested in the study. 
2 Tolerance levels for totru and categories of disclosure indicate there is no coefficie:nt 
approaching zero. Even though proxies of SIZE, total assets, t<>tal sales and markei 
capitalisation, have tolerance coefficients less than 0.5, they do not demonstrate the presence 
of harmful multicollinearity. In this case, VIF of the variables were examined and the 
results which are less than 10 confirms the absence of harmful multicollinearity in these 
models. 
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Satisfaction of the assumptions underlying the multivariate analysis has 
been examined and discussed in the previous section. The alternative 
variations of the twelve sets of predictors h&ve been discussed and 
tabulated in Table 4.5 and noted with a consecutive number. Predictors in 
models 1 to 6 include prior year economic performance of companies whilst 
predictors in models 7 to 12 include current year economic performance. 
The complete statistical results of all multiple regression analysis are 
provided in Appendix E. From these statistical results, the highest adjusted 
R2 for total and categories of disclosure based on each indexing method were 
selected and considered as the "best" modeJ.2 The selection of the 15 "best" 
multiple regression models are presented in Table 5.4. To accept the results, 
variables must have a significance level up to 10%. This is to protect 
explanatory variables already admitted in the equation that have a 
significance level higher than 5% but not over 10% (Draper and Smith, 
1981). 
The following subsections discuss further the statistical results for the ''best" 
multiple regression models based on each indexing method. 
5.5.2.1 Word Index 
The statistical results for the five "best" models based on word index are 
presented in detail in Table 5.5. In this table, total disclosure, category 1, and 
category 3 are grouped together because they relate to models which contain 
economic performance variables h1 the prior year whereas category 2 and 
category 4 relate to models which contain economic performance variables 
in the current year. 
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Table 5.4 
The Besr Multiple Regression Models for Each Dependent Vuiable 
Dependent Type of Type of Model Adjusted R2 .... 
Variables Disclosure 
Word Index 
WORDTOT Total disclosure Model 5 0.466 
WORD-1 Category 1 Model 4 0.509 
WORD-2 Category2 Model 10 0.410 
WORD-3 Category 3 Model 3 0.458 
WORD-4 Category4 Model 12 0.115 
Unweighted Index 
UWGTOT Total disclosure Model 8 0.562 
UWGT-1 Category 1 Model 8 0.527 
UWGT-2 Category 2 Model 10 0.420 
UWGT-3 Category 3 Model 3 0.451 
UWGT-4 Category 4 Model 7 0.140 
Weighted Index 
WGTOT Total disclosure Model 5 0.399 
WGT-1 Category 1 Model 5 0.384 
WGT-2 Category 2 Model 3 0.292 
WGT-3 Category 3 Model 3 0.340 
WGT-4 Category4 Model 7 0.049 
.. Best is determined by the highest value for the adjusted R2 
** One-tailed statistical test 
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TableS.5 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression: Word Index• 
Variables Expected Total Qiscl2~Y[~ Csit~gs;icy l Qlmgor:;:a 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. 
Prior Period 
Ln (ROA92) + 1.568 0.747 0.373 0.710 -2.698 0.751 -0.805 0.424 6.255 0.741 1.576 0.120 
Ln(ROE92) + -0.517 0.737 -1.014 0.314 -0.636 0.738 -1.560 0.124 -0.397 0.695 -0.804 0.424 
Ln (total sal !S) + 0.213 0.444 2.745 0.008 
Ln (total assets) + - - 0.261 0.446 3.916 0.000 0.259 0.435 3.261 0.002 
AUD + 0.181 0.810 0.646 0.521 -0.084 0.778 -0.369 0.713 -0.061 0.770 -0.228 0.821 
Ln (~W) - 0.548 0.612 1.381 0.172 0.274 0.655 0.891 0.376 
Sqrt (OLS) - - - - - - 0.469 0.660 0.859 0.394 
'° 
°' 
Ln(LEV92) + 0.059 0.717 0.405 0.687 -0.036 0.751 0.315 0.754 0.016 0.721 0.116 0.908 
Ln (CAPINT) + 0.194 0.717 1.886 0.064 0.037 0.674 0.431 0.668 0.134 0.662 1.332 0.187 
ENCO + 0.445 0.899 0.992 0.325 0.666 0.902 1.859 0.068 -0.004 0.912 -0.010 0.992 
Sqrt (OWN) - -0.050 0.715 -0.706 0.483 -0.046 0.714 -0.812 0.420 -0.043 0.754 -0.666 0.508 
PRES + 0.826 0.575 3.194 0.002 0.503 0.557 2.392 0.020 0.767 0.577 3.157 0.002 
Constant n.a. -11.872 0.660 17.498 0.419 -44.905 0.085 
Multiple R 0.732 0.757 0.728 
R2 0.536 0.573 0.529 
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.509 0.458 
F-ratio 7.638 (p = 0.000) 8.871 (p = 0.000) 7.423 (p = 0.000) 
• One-tailed statistical test 
Table !-.5 (Continued) 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression: Word Index-
Variables Expected CiimgQI)!:2 Cati:ggcy: j 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. 
Current Period 
Ln (ROA93) + 0.968 0.778 2.037 0.046 0.956 0.763 1.641 0.106 
Ln(ROE93) + -0.415 0.866 -2.046 0.045 -0.166 0.8?3 -0.676 0.502 
Ln (ASSETS) + 0.212 0.479 4.586 0.000 
Ln (M,-'..RCAP) + 0.120 0.605 2.348 0.022 
AUD + -0.046 0.800 -0.295 0.769 0.062 0.850 0333 0.740 
Sqrt(OLS} 0.280 0.684 0.854 0.396 0.138 0.700 0.351 o:n.1 
Ln(LEV93) + -0.106 0.790 -1.360 0.178 0.100 0.847 1.110 0.275 
Ln (CAPIN11 + 0.027 0.755 0.470 0.640 0.051 0.760 0.431 0.465 
ENCO + -0.061 0.910 -0.237 0.814 0.8(11 0.930 2.623 0.011 
Sqrt (OWN) -0.035 0.764 -0.883 0.380 0.014 0.762 0.302 0.764 
PRES + 0.233 0.575 1.576 0.120 -0.099 0.604 -0.565 0.574 
Constant -6.118 0.018 -6.633 0.041 
Multiple R 0.698 0.479 
R2 0.487 0.230 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.115 
F-ratio 6.350 (p = 0.000) 1200 (p = 0.047) 
• One-tailed statistical test 
97 
In total disclosure, model 5, which contains prior year economic 
performance variables, has an adjusted R2 = 46.6% and this model is 
statistically significant (F = 7.638; p = 0.000). SIZE (p < 0.01), which is 
measured by total sales, PRES (p < 0.01), and CAPINT (p < 0.10) are 
significant explanatory variables and in the expected sign. 
In category 1, model 4, which contains prior year economic performance 
variables, has an adjusted R2 = 50.9% and this model is statistically 
significant (F = 8.871; p = 0.000). SIZE (p < 0.01), which is meas~red by total 
assets, PRES (p < 0.05) and ENCO (p < 0.10) are significant variables and in 
the expected sign. 
In category 2, model 10, which contains current year economic performance 
variables, has an adjusted R2 = 41 % and this model is statistically significant 
(F = 6.350; p = 0.000). ROA93, ROE93 and SIZE, which is measured by total 
assets (all with p < 0.05), are significant explanatory variables. Except for 
ROE93, these explanatory variables are in the expected sign. 
In category 3, model 3, which contains prior year economic performance 
variables has an adjusted R2 = 45.8% and this model is statistically 
significant (F = 7.423; p = 0.000). SIZE, which is measured by total assets, and 
PRES (both with p < 0.01) are significant variables and in the expected sign. 
In category 4, model 12, which contains current year economic performance 
variables, has an adjusted R2 = 11.5% and this model is statistically 
significant (F = 1.998; p < 0.05). SIZE, which is measured by market 
capitalisation, and ENCO {both with p < 0.05) are significant variables and in 
the expected sign. 
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In summary, in the five "best" models variable SIZE is the most significant 
variable to total and categories of disclosure regardless of measure being 
used. PRES has significant :influence on the extent of total disclosure, 
disdosure LTl category 1 and category 3. In addition, ENCO is significantly 
associated with the extent of disclosure in category 1 and category 4, whereas 
ROA93 and ROE93 are significantly associated with the extent of disclosure 
in category 2. Except for ROE93, these variables have the expected sign. 
5.5.2.2 Unweighted Index 
Table 5.6 shows statistical results for the "best" five models in unweighted 
i.'"\dex. In this table, total disclosure, disclosure in category 1, category 2 and 
category 4 are grouped together because they relate io models which contain 
current year economic performance variables whereas disclosure in category 
3 is associated with a model which contains prior year economic 
performance variables. Tolerance levels of total and categories of disclosure 
indicate there is no harmful multicollinearity. Tolerance coefficients are far 
from zero and VIF coefficients for t!w variables confirm the absence of 
harmful multicollinearity. 
In total disclosure, model 8, which contains current year economic 
performance variables, has an adjusted R2 = 56.2% and this model is 
statistically significant (F = 10.862; p = 0.000). Variable SIZE, which is 
measured by total sales, (p = 0.00) and PRES (p < 0.01) are significant 
variables and in the expected sign. 
Similarly, model 8 is the best for disclosure in category 1. This model has an 
adjusted Rl = 52.7% and is statistically significant (F = 9.594; p = 0.000). Five 
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Table 5.6 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression: Unweighted Index• 
Variables Expected CategQcyJ 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. 
Pr10r Period 
Ln (ROA92) + 1.292 0.741 1.156 0.252 
Ln(ROE92) + -0.047 0.695 -0.336 0.738 
Ln (total assets) + 0.082 0.435 3.668 0.000 
AUD + -0.017 0.770 -0.221 0.826 
Sqrt (OLS) 0.133 0.660 0.862 0.392 
Ln (LEV92) + -0.005 0.721 -0.119 0.905 
Ln (CAPINT) + 0.031 0.662 1.084 0.282 
ENCO + 0.005 0.912 0.042 0.966 
Sqrt (OWN) -0.008 0.754 -0.431 0.668 
PRES + 0.197 0.577 2.876 0.005 
Constant n.a. -10.034 -1.388 0.170 
Multiple R 0.72325 
R2 0.52309 
Ad;usted R2 0.45083 
F-ratio 7.23903 (p = 0.000) 
.. One-tailed statistical test 
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Table S.6 (Continued) 
Resu!ts of OLS Multiple Regression: Unweighted Index• 
Variables Expected Totill ~la:um: ~ill!!ill[)'. l Catl!g:Q[)'. 2. Ca=J:l!.~ 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. B T..,l~rance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. 
Current Period 
Ln(ROA93) + 0.229 0.785 0.884 0.380 0.135 0.785 0.711 0.479 0.195 0.778 2.097 0.040 0.148 0.778 1.581 0.119 
Ir (ROE93) + -0.079 0.839 -0.702 0.485 -0.114 0.839 -1.383 0.171 -0.077 0.866 -1.928 0.058 -0.039 0.850 -0.978 0.332 
Ln(SALES) + 0.117 0.452 4.813 0.000 0.082 0.452 4.630 0.000 
Ln (ASSETS) + 0.044 0.479 4.837 0.000 
Ln(MARCAP) + 0.026 0.605 3.183 0.002 
AUD + -9.960 0.823 -0.012 0.991 -0.006 0.823 -0.103 0.918 -0.010 0.800. -0.323 0.747 -0.015 0.861 -0.501 0.618 
Ln (S-W) 0.174 0.653 1.438 0.155 0.135 0.653 1.524 0.132 
-
-0.031 0.678 -0.734 0.466 
Sqrt(OLS) 0.055 0.684 0.830 0.393 
Ln(LEV93) + -0.070 0.730 -1.569 0.121 -0.070 0.730 -2.158 0.035 -0.020 0.790 -1.337 0.186 -1.256 0.865 -0.009 0.993 
; Ln (CAPINT) + 0.051 0.793 1.663 0.101 0.021 0.793 0.943 0.349 0.003 0.755 0.230 0.819 0.004 0.767 0.351 0.726 
- ENCO + 0.161 0.895 1.138 0.259 0.201 0.895 1.939 0.057 0.010 0.910 0.195 0.846 0.110 0.923 :-:'.193 0.032 
Sqrt(OWN) -0.031 0.732 -1.400 0.166 -0.031 0.732 -1.905 0.061 -0.007 0.764 -0.895 0.374 2.382 0.729 o.mo 0.976 
PRES + 0.248 0.558 3.011 0.004 0.135 0.558 2.237 0.029 0.042 0.575 1.438 0.155 -0.020 0.585 -0.697 0.488 
Constant -2.492 0.075 -1.145 0.260 -1.286 0.012 -0.913 0.081 
Multiple R 0.786 0.767 0.704 0.502 
R2 0.619 0.589 0.496 0.252 
Adjusted R2 0.562 0.527 0.420 0.140 
F-ratio 10.862 (p = 0.000) 9.594 (p = 0.000) 6.582 (p = 0.000) 2.258 (p =0.024) 
• One-tailed statistical test 
variables have significant explanatory power: SIZE (p = 0.00), which is 
measured by total sales, ENCO (p < 0.10), LEV93 (p < 0.05), OWN (p < 0.10), 
and PRES (p < 0.05). Except for LEV93, these variables have the expected 
sign. 
In category 2, model 10, which contains current year economic performance 
variables has an adjusted R2 = 42% and this model is statistically significant 
(F = 6.582; p = 0.000). Variables SIZE (p = 0.00), which is measured by total 
assets, ROA93 (p < 0.05) and ROE93 (p < 0.10), have significant explanatory 
power. Except for ROE93 which is in the opposite sign, these variables have 
the expected sign. 
Disclosure in category 3, model 3, which contains prior year economic 
performance variables has an adjusted R2 = 45.1% and this model is 
statistically significant (F = 7.239; p = 0.000). SIZE (p < 0.01), which is 
measured by total assets, and PRES (p < 0.01) are significant variables in this 
model and in the expected sign. 
Disclosure in category 4, model 7, which contains current year economic 
performance variables has an adjusted R2 = 14% and is statistically 
significant (F = 2.258; p = 0.024). Two variables are found to have significant 
explanatory power, namely, SIZE (p < 0.01), which is measured by market 
capitalisation, and ENCO (p < 0.05). These variables have the expected sign. 
In summary, whatever measure being used, SIZE is the most significant 
variable to voluntary environmental disclosure in terms of total and all 
categories of disclosure. PRES is significantly associated with total disclosure, 
disclosure in cntegory 1 and category 3. ENCO significantly relates to 
disclosure in category 1 and category 4. LEV93 and OWN is significantly 
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associated with disclosure in category 1 whilst ROA93 and ROE93 are 
significantly associated with category 2. Except for LEV93 and ROE93, these 
variables have the expected sign. 
5.5.2.3 Weighted Index 
Table 5.7 provides statistical results for the "best" five models in weighted 
index. In this table, total disclosure, category 1, category 2 and category 3 are 
grouped together becaus1? they are associated with models which contain 
prior year economic performance variables. Category 4 is tabulated 
separately because it relates to current year economic performance variables. 
Tolerance levels for all variables in the models indicate there is no harmful 
multicollinearity. VIF coefficients are less than 10 which confirms the 
absence of harmful multicollinearity in the models. 
In total disclosure, model 5, which contains prior year economic 
performance variables, has an adjusted R2 = 39.9% and is statistically 
significant (F = 6.039, p = 0.000). SIZE (p < 0.05), which is measured by iotal 
sales, RISK (S-W) (p < 0.10), and PRES (p < 0.01) are significant variables. 
Except for RISK (S-W), they have the expected sign. 
Model 5 is also the best for category 1. It has an adjusted R2 = 38.4% and is 
statistically significant (F = 5.734; p = 0.000). Variables ROE92 (p < 0.05), SIZE 
(p < 0.01) which is measured by total sales, and PRES (p < 0.10) are 
significant in this model. SIZE and PRESS are in the expected sign whilst 
ROE92 is not in the expected sign. 
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Tables:/ 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression: Weighted Index• 
-
Variables Expected Iatal Di:H:!1231,m: Ca~g2ll'. l Caf!:gol'.):'. 2. Olt~a 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. B Tolerance T Prob. 
Prior Period 
Ln(ROA92) + 2.304 0.747 0.865 0.390 0.918 0.747 0.417 0.678 2.268 0.741 2.064 0.043 4.769 0.741 1.994 0.050 
Ln(ROE9.2) + -0.425 0.737 -1.315 0.193 -0.569 0.737 -2.128 0.037 -0.340 0.695 -2.490 0.015 -0.235 0.695 -0.791 0.432 
Ln(SALES) + 0.125 0.444 2.530 0.014 0.122 0.444 2.982 0.004 
Ln(ASSETS) + . . 0.083 0.435 3.758 0.000 0.118 0.435 2.467 0.016 
AUD + 0.163 0.810 0920 0.361 0.029 0.810 0.195 0.846 0.010 0.770 0.129 0.898 0.066 0.770 0.404 0.688 
Ln (S-W) . 0.449 0.612 1.785 0.079 0.288 0.612 1.382 0.172 
Sqrt(OLS) 0.310 0.660 2.052 0.044 0.350 0.660 1.064 0.291 
Ln(LEV92) + 0.042 0.717 0.459 0.648 -0.021 0.717 -0.277 0.782 -0.030 0.721 -0.809 0.422 0.031 0.721 0.374 0.710 
- Ln (CAPINl') + 0.094 0.111 1.431 0.157 0.045 0.717 0.836 0.406 0.014 0.662 0.503 0.617 0.061 0.662 1.000 0.321 
Q ENCO + 0.248 0.899 0.873 0.386 0.337 0.899 1.429 0.158 0.053 0.912 0.460 0.647 0.030 0.912 0.120 0.905 
.is, Sqrt (OWN) . 
-0.038 0.715 -0.843 0.402 -0.037 0.715 -1.003 0.319 -0.016 0.75( -0.873 0.386 -0.018 0.754 -0.464 0.644 
PRES + 0.443 0.575 2.699 0.009 0.263 0.575 1.936 0.057 0.030 0.577 0.447 0.656 0.383 0.577 2.615 0.011 
Constant n.a. -15.499 0.367 -4.804 0.735 -15.021 0.038 -33.294 0.035 
Multiple R 0.691 0.682 0.621 0.653 
R2 0.478 0.465 0.385 0.427 
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.384 0.292 0.340 
F-ratio 6.039 (p = 0.000) 5.734 (p = 0.000) 4.133 (p = 0.000) 4.919 (p = 0.000) 
• One-tailed statistical test 
Table 5.7 (Continued) 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression: Weighted Indexit 
Variables Expected Categocy4 
Sign B Tolerance T Prob. 
Current Period 
Ln(ROA93) + 0.331 0.778 1.293 0.200 
Ln (ROE93) + -0.097 0.850 -0.883 0.380 
Ln (MARVAL) + 0.045 0.605 1.969 0.053 
AUD + 0.014 0.861 0.166 0.869 
Ln (S-W) -0.020 0.678 -0.173 0.863 
Ln (LEV93) + 0.049 0.865 1.235 0.221 
Ln (CAPINT) + 0.010 0.767 0.335 0.739 
ENCO + 0.257 0.923 1.879 0.065 
Sqrt (OWN) 0.003 0.729 0.123 0.903 
PRES + -0.036 0.585 -0.450 0.654 
Constant n.a. -1.970 0.166 
Multiple R 0.416 
R2 0.173 
Adjusted R2 0.049 
F-ratio 1.400 (p = 0.199) 
"" One-tailed statistical test 
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Disclosure in category 2, model 3 is statistically significant (F= 4.133; p = 
0.000). This model, which contains prior year economic performance 
variables, has an adjusted R2 = 29.2%. SIZE (p = 0.000), which is measured by 
total assets, RISK (OLS), ROA92 and ROE92 with p < 0.05 are significant 
explanatory variables. Except for RISK (OLS), they have the expected sign. 
Similarly, model 3 is also the best model in category 3. This model has an 
adjusted R2 = 34% and is statistically significant (F = 4.919; p = 0.0001). ROA92 
(p = 0.050), SIZE (p < 0.05), which is measured by total assets, and PRES (p < 
0.05) are found to be significant variables in this model and have the 
expected sign. 
Disclosure in category 4, model 7 is not statistically significant (F = 1.400; p = 
0.199). This model, which contains current year economic performance 
variables, has an adjusted R2 = 4.9%. Nevertheless, SIZE, which is measured 
by market capitalisation, and ENCO, both with p < 0.10, are found to be 
significant variables in the model and they have the expected sign. 
ln summary, in the "best" five models, SIZE is the most significant 
explanatory variable and in the expected sign regardless of measure being 
used. PRES is significantly associated with total disclosure, disclosure in 
category 1 and category 3 whereas ENCO is significantly associated with 
category 4. RISK (OLS), ROA92 and ROE92 significantly relate to disclosure 
in category 2 whereas RISK (S-W) is significantly associated with total 
disclosure. Except for RISK {OLS and S-W) and ROE92, these variables have 
the expected sign. 
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5.6 Discussion of the Results 
Based on the" best" models for each index, it is found that each index 
explains differently the extent of total and categories of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. This is also the case for the dimensions of 
stakeholder theory. Discussion of the extent of disclosure and stakeholder 
theory is presented in the following subsections. 
5.6.1 The Extent of Environmental Disclosure 
Total disclosure for the unweighted index is significantly associated with 
model 8 and produces the highest adjusted R2 = 56.2%. The adjusted R2 is 
considerably higher than the word and weighted indices. As this index treats 
disclosure and non-disclosure companies equally (Cooke, 1989), it possesses 
a neutral procedure. 
Disclosure in category 1 (corporate environmental policies and strategies) 
for the unweighted index is significantly associated with model 8 and 
produces the highest adjusted R2 = 52.7%. Mineral mining companits tend 
to develop advanced environmental programs (Coopers & Lybrand cited in 
Kestigian, 19Q1) and disclose them in the annual report. This disclosure 
provides positive information to stakeholders (Deegan, 1994; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1994) and therefore the companies are willing to disclose this 
information. 
Disclosure in category 2 (recognition of environmental activities) for the 
unweighted index is significantly associated with model 10 and produces the 
highest adjusted R2 = 42%. This is almost identical to the word index, which 
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has an adjusted R2 of 41 %. The extent of disclosure in this category is 
expected because disclosure of this information is positive information to 
stakeholders. 
Disclosure in category 3 {prevention or repair of environmental damage) for 
the word index is significantly associated with model 3 and produces the 
highest adjusted R2 = 45.8%. The unweighted index is marginally lower with 
an adjusted R2 of 45.1 %. This is the only model that contains prior year 
economic performance variables. To undertake prevention or repair of 
environmental damage requires a considerable outlay and companies 
should satisfy expectations of shareholders prior to doing these 
environmental activities (R. W. Roberts, 1992). Therefore, a reasonable level 
of economic performance is necessary in dealing witL environmental 
activities (Ullmann, 1985). 
Disclosure in category 4 (environmental liabilities) for the unweighted 
index is significantly associated with model 7 and produces the highest 
adjusted R2 = 14%. A possible expianation is that the disclosure of 
environmental liability information can create conflicts of interest to 
corporate stakeholders (Cerf, 1993). Therefore management is unwilling to 
disclose this sensitive information. 
In summary, the unweighted index is the 'best" index for total and three 
categories of disclosure whilst tht word index is the "best" for disclosure in 
category 3. The highest information to be voluntarily disclosed in the 
annual report is information relating to corporate environmental policies 
and strategies (category 1) and the lowest information to be disclosed is 
information about environmental liabilities (category 4). 
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5.6.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theoretical framework is applied to explain each model. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, the unweighted index generates the 
highest adjusted R2 for total and three categories of disclosure whilst the 
word index produces the highest adjusted R2 for disclosure in category 3. 
Consequently, discussion of the results based or the significant variables in 
each model in the unweighted index and the word index are elaborated in 
the framework of the three drmensions of the stakeholder theory. 
Model 8 is significantly associated with the extent of total disclosure and 
PRES and SIZE measured by total sales are significant variables in this 
model and in the expected sign. This means that hypotheses H3 and HS 
(H82) are supported. The other variables in this model are not significant 
and therefore hypotheses Hl, H2 (H22), H4, HS (H52), H6 (H62), H7 (H72), 
H9, and HlO are rejected. PRES represents stakeholder power dimension 
and SIZE is treated as a control variable. Thus, the stakeholder power 
dimension partially explains the extent of total disclosure whilst the 
strategic posture and economic performance dimensions do not 
significantly explain the extent of disclosure. This is consistent with the 
findings of R. W. Roberts (1992) that social disclosure was undertaken to 
reduce governmental influence. 
Similarly, model 8 is significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in 
category 1 and OWN, LEV, PRES, ENCO and SIZE measured by total sales 
are significant in this model. However, LEV is in the opposite sign. This 
means that hypotheses Hl, H3, H4 and HB (H82) are supported. The other 
variables in this model are not significant and therefore hypotheses H2 
(H22), H5 (H52), H6 (H62), H7 (H72), H9, and HlO are rejected. OWN and 
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PRES represent stakeholder power dimension and ENCO represents 
strategic posture dimension. The extent of disclosure in category 1 is 
significantly associated with the strategic posture dimension and is partially 
associated with the stakeholder power dimension. However, the economic 
performance dimension does not significantly explain the extent of 
disclosure. The significance of widespread ownership (OWN) supports the 
result of Craswell and Taylor (1992) but it is contrary to the result of R. W. 
Roberts (1992) who used a different measure for ownership (i.e., percentage 
of corporation owned by management and by individual sharehoiders). The 
significance of ENCO is consistent with R. W. Roberts although the proxy 
used in this study is different. In other words, strategic posture is a powerful 
dimension in the stakeholder framework. 
Model 10 is significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in category 
2 and variables ROA, ROE and SIZE measured by total assets are significant 
in this model. However, ROE is in the opposite sign. This means that 
hypothesis H5 (H52) and H8 (H81) are supported. The other variables in this 
model are not significant and therefore hypotheses HI, H2 (H22), H3, H4, H6 
(H62), H7 (H72), H9, and HlO are rejected. ROA represents economic 
performance dimension. Accordingly, the economic performance 
dimension partially explains the extent of disclosure in category 2 whilst the 
stakeholder power and strategic posture dimensions do not significantly 
explain this disclosure. The significance of ROA in part supports the 
contention of McGuire et al. (1988) that ROA is closely related to corporate 
sociaJ responsibility. The finding of ROE is inconsistent with the finding of 
R. W. Roberts (1992). The possible reason for this different result is that he 
adopted a different measure, growth in return on equity, and four year 
period. 
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Model 3 is significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in category 3 
measured by the word index and PRES and SIZE measured by total assets are 
significant variables in this model and in the expected sign. This means that 
hypothesis H3 and H81 are supported. The other variables in this model are 
not significant and therefore hypotheses Hl, H2 (H21), H4, HS (HSl), H6 
(H61), H7 (H71), H9, and HlO are rejected. PRES is the only significant 
variable in stakeholder power dimension. Accordingly, the stakeholder 
power dimension partially explains the extent of disclosure in category 3 
whilst the strategic posture and economic performance dimensions do not 
significantly explain this disclosure. 
Model 7 is significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in category 4 
and ENCO and SIZE measured by market capitalisation are significant 
variables in the model and in the expected direction. This means that 
hypothesis H4 and H83 are accepted. The other variables in this model are 
not significant and therefore hypotheses Hl, H2 (H22), H3, HS (H52), H6 
(H62), H7 (H72), H9, and HlO are rejected. As ENCO represents strategic 
posture dimension this dimension significantly explains the extent of 
disclosure in category 4. The stakeholder power and economic performance 
dimensions do not significantly explain this disclosure. 
In conclusion, the empirical results provide evidence that the stakeholder 
theoretical framework only partially explains the motivation of firms to 
voluntarily disclose environmental information. Three dimensions of 
stakeholder theory in each of the five best models are associated with 
different categories of disclosure. Stakeholder power could only partially 
explain total disclosure and disclosure in category 1 in the unweighted index 
and disclosure in category 3 in the word index. Strategic posture is the most 
significant dimension explaining the extent of disclosure in category 1 and 
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category 4. SIZE as a control variable is the most significant variable in terms 
of total and categories of disclosure. These findings do not entirely 
corroborate the theoretical framework developed by Ullmann (1985) and the 
results of R. W. Roberts (1992). 
5.7 Summary 
The results of statistical analyses of the variables in the study were 
elaborated in this chapter. Statistical problems of the observed data were 
resolved by conducting transformations. 
Three indices were used to measure the extent of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. The variations of alternative measures for SIZE, RISK, ROA, 
ROE, and LEV produced twelve differE>nt models of explanatory variables. 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation, tolerance and variance inflation 
factor tests were performed to check the presence of multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables in the twelve models. The results 
indicated there was no harmful multicollinearity among the variables. 
The main statistical test in this study is OLS multiple regression analysis 
The results suggest that the unweighted index (dichotomous index) best 
fitted the extent of disclosure followed by word index (the number of words) 
and then weighted index (the importance of environmental items). It was 
found that the most significant form of disclosure was environmental 
policies and strategies (category 1) and the least significant to be 
environmental liabilities (category 4). 
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Not all three dimensions of stakeholder theory are significant in total or any 
category of disclosure. The strategic posture dimension of stakeholder 
theory is significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in category 1 
and category ·1. Stakeholder power dimension partially explains the extent of 
total disclosure, disclosure in category 1 and category 3. Economic 
performance dimension is partially associated with the extent of disclosure 
in category 2. Two dimensions, stakeholder power and strategic posture, are 
associated with the extent of disclosure in category 1. 
Conclusions and implications of this study and suggestions for further 
research are presented in chapter 6. Limitations to this study are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
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6.1 Summary 
Chapter6 
CONCLUSIONS 
A review of literature discussed in chapter 2 provides pertinent explanatory 
variables associated with voluntary social and environmental disclosure. It 
was noted th.:it firm size, industry classification, profitability, systematic rt3k, 
leverage, ownership, capital intensity, social pressures and the presence of 
social responsibility committee were associated with the extent of voluntary 
social and environmental disclosure. In prior research, various theoretical 
frameworks have been used to explain the relationship of firm 
characteristics and the incidence of voluntary social and environmental 
disclosure. 
Chapter 3 d~als with the development of stakeholder theory as proposed by 
Ullmann (1985) and the development of hypotheses. Based on the 
stakeholder framework, 17 hypotheses were generated. These hypotheses 
were based on 11 explanatory variables, which were grouped into three 
dimensions: stakeholder power variables - ownership diffusion, political 
pressure, operating leverage; strategic posture - the presence of an 
environmental responsibility committee; economic performance - return 
on assets, return on equity, systematic risk; and control variables - firm size, 
capital intensity, independent auditor, commercial production. 
The dependent variable is the extent of voluntary environmental disclosure 
consisting of four categories: environmental policy, prevention of 
environmental damage, public recognition of environmental activities and 
environmental liabilities. This study examined overall disclosure as well as 
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categories of disclosure. Three different indices, word index, unweighted 
index and weighted index, were adopted to measure the extent of 
environmental disclosure. 
Chapter 4 discusses research design and procedure, definition of variables 
and statistical technique. Data for the 1992 and 1993 period were primarily 
obtained from the AGSM Annual Reports Microfiche File. Other data were 
taken from the AMIC 1994 annual report, the Australian Stock Exchange 
Journal, June 1993 and December 1993 editions, and the AGSM Risk 
Measurement Service. Definitions of predictor variables follow those of 
previous studies, exc~pt for political pressure and commercial production. 
Statistical problems relating to raw data for both dependent and 
independent variables were examined and the existence of problems were 
resolved by transformation. Multicollinearity was tested by Pearson 
correlation matrix, tolerance and VIF test. The results indicated the absence 
of this problem. 
Results of data analysis were presented and elaborated in chapter 5. 
Multivariate analysis was applied to test the relationships of 12 models of 
explanatory variables and tht. extent of total and categories of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. In this study there are 180 multivaridte analyses 
and discussions of the results focused on the "best" five multiple regression 
models for each index. The model in each category of disclosure for each 
index that had the highest adjusted R2 was selected and tabulated. Detailed 
results of the statistical tests were then elaborated in this chapter. 
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6.2 Findings of the Study 
The index that best fitted the extent of environmental disclosure was the 
unweighted index. This index produced four of the five best models of 
explanatory variables all of which were statistically significant. However, 
the remaining model attributed to the word index was only marginally 
better. Disclosure of information relating to environmental policies and 
strategies was the most significant with an adjusted R2 = 56.2% whilst 
environmental liability related information was the least significant with 
an adjusted R2 = 14%. 
The implication of this finding is that, content analysis used in the 
unweighted index can capture the extent of environmental disclosure 
made in the annual report in relation to environmental policies and 
strategies, recognition of environmental activities, prevention or repair of 
environmental damage and environmental liabilities. Consequently, users 
can evaluate environmental information based on the presence or absence 
of its disclosure in the annual report without having to consider the 
relative importance or the amount of information. The adjusted R2 for 
disclosure of environmental liabilities is considerably lower than for other 
categories, which is probably due to it not being seen as positive 
information. This implies that the regulators of accounting information 
need to monitor disclosure of environmental liabilities. 
This study also provided empirical evidence on the extent of voluntary 
environmental disclosure by Australian listed mineral mining companies 
within the stakeholder theoretical framework. It was found that not all 
three dimensions of the theory ~ere significant in any one model. In the 
stakeholder power dimension, ownership diffusion and the membership of 
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the AMIC partially explained the extent of total disclosure, disclosure of 
environmental policy related information and disclosure of repair of 
environmental damage. In the strategic posture dimension, the presence of 
environmental responsibility committee was significantly associated with 
disclosure of environmental policy related information and environmental 
liability related information. Thus, the extent of environmental policy 
related disclosure could be explained by the stakeholder power and strategic 
power dimensions. In the economic performance dimension, return on 
assets was associated with disclosure of public recognition of corporate 
environmental activities. Firm size a control variable was significant 
among the three dimensions. 
Therefore, the stakeholder theoretical framework partially explained 
practice of environmental disclosure by Austra~,an listed mineral mining 
companies. The implication of this finding is that other variables need to be 
included in the dimensions of the stakeholder model. For example, sources 
of information other than the annual report. Ideally, location of mining 
companies could be used to test the sensitivity of a mining area but this is 
not possible for all companies as a considerable number have multiple 
locations. 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The results of this study are subject to several limitations. At the time of the 
study, data for systematic risk was only available to September 1993. Also, 
the study was limited to mineral mining companies listed in the AGSM 
Annual Report File. This data source contains the top SOO firms by markP.! 
capitalisation therefore the results may not be generalizable. In aldition, 
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this study includes only a single period of observations. Only one user 
group, financial analysts were used to assess the relative importance of each 
environmental item of disclosure and this may introduce bias into the 
results. Furthermore, environmental disclosure is not restricted to the 
annual report, as some companies disclose the information in other media 
instruments. 
The limitations of this study suggest directions for future research. A 
longitudinal study which includes all listed mineral mining companies 
would enhance the generalizability of the findings. Other user groups could 
be used to assess the relative importance of the environmental items. Also, 
sources of environmental information other than the annual report could 
be investigated and included as an additional variable. 
Further research could be undertaken in several directions. Research in 
environmental disclosure could include oil and gas companies and 
industrial companies. The needs of different user groups and how they 
evaluate and utilise this information could be investigated. Finally, as 
environmental matters are a global issue, the practice of environmental 
disclosure could be examined in other countries with different cultures. 
Although the findings do not support all of the hypotheses, the application 
of the stakeholder theoretical framework together with the different indices 
in one study reflects the efficacy of the stakeholder framework on corporate 
environmental disclosure in Australia. A new variable, the membership of 
the AMIC, was significant. The results of this study augment the 
understanding of practice of voluntary environmental disclosure by 
Australian listed mineral mining companies. 
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Appendix A 
LIST OF MINERAL MINING COMPANIES 
No. Name 
1. Aberfoyle Limited* 
2. Alcan Australia 
3. Allied Queensland Coalfields Limited 
4. Anglo Pacific Resources 
5. Asarco Australia Limited* 
6. Ashton Mining Limited* 
7. Austmin Gold NL 
8. Austpac Gold NL 
9. Australian Mining Investments Limited 
10. Ballarat Goldfields NL 
11 Battle Mountain Gold Company* 
12. Bougainville Copper Limited 
13. Boulder Gold NL 
14. Burmine Limited 
15. Centaur Mining & Exploration Limited 
16. Central Norseman Gold Corporation Limited* 
17. Churchill Resources NL 
18. Climax Mining Limited 
19. Cluff Resources Pacific Limited 
20. Clutha Limited 
21. Coal & Allied Industries Limited* 
22. Comalco Limited"" 
23. Consolidated Rutile Limited* 
24. Coolawin Resources Limited 
25. Coolgardie Gold NL 
26. CRA Limited"" 
27. Croesus Mining NL 
28. Cudgen R.Z. Limited* 
29. Delta Gold NL 
30. Denehurst Limited* 
31. Devex Limited 
32. Dominion Mining Limited* 
33. Eastmet Limited 
34. Emperor Mines Limited 
35. Energy Resources of Australia Limited* 
36. Equatorial Mining NL 
37. Euraust Minerals Development 
38. First National Resources Trust 
39. Forrestania Gold NL 
40. Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie Limited* 
41. Golden Shamrock ~,fines Limited 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
LIST OF MINERAL MINING COMPANIES 
No. Name 
42. Great Central Mines NL 
43. Gwalia Consolidated Limited 
44. Helix Resources NL 
45. Herald Resources Limited 
46. Highlands Goltl Limited 
47. Homestake Gold of Australia Limited 
48. Hunter Resources Limited 
49. Johnson's Well Mining NL 
50. Kidston Gold Mines Limited* 
51. Kitchener Mining NL 
52. Lachlan Resources NL 
53. Little River Goldfields NL 
54. Macraes Mining Company Limited 
55. Metana Minerals NL 
56. Mineral Resources (NZ) Limited 
57. Minerals Mining & Metallurgy Limited" 
58. Minproc Holdings Limited 
59. Mount Burgess Gold Mining Company Ltd 
60. Mt. Carrington Mines Ltd 
61. Mount Edon Gold Mines (Australia) Limited 
6'.l. Mt. Kersey Mining NL 
63. Mt. Leyshon Gold Mines Limited* 
64. Mt. Martin Gold Mines NL 
65. Newcrest Mining Limited* 
66. Newmex Exploration 
67. Niugini Mining Ltd 
68. Normandy Poseidon Limited,. 
69. North Broken Hill Peko Ltd* 
70. North Flinders Mines Limited,. 
71. Oakbridge Limited 
72. Orion Resources NL 
73. Pasminco Limited* 
74. Pelsart Resources NL 
75. Perserverance Corporation Ltd 
76. Placer Dome Inc. 
77. Placer Pacific Limited* 
78. Plutonic Resources Limited 
79. Portman Mining Limited 
80. Poseidon Gold Limited* 
81. QCT Resources Limited* 
82. QNI Limited* 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
LIST OF MINERAL MINING COMPANIES 
No. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
Name 
Queensland Metals Corporation Limited 
Renison Goldfields Consolidated Limited• 
Resolute Resources Ltd 
Roebuck Resources NL 
Ross Mining NL 
Sabminco NL 
Samantha Gold I\1L 
Savage Resources Limited 
Sedimentary Holdings Limited 
Sons of Gwalia Ltd"' 
Spargos Mining NL 
St. Barbara Mines Ltd 
Strategic Minerals Corporation NL 
Titan Resources NL 
Triad Minerals NL 
Union Gold Mining Company NL 
Valdora Minerals NL 
Walhalla Mining Company NL 
Western Austra 1ian Diamond Trust 
Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited"' 
Westralian Sands Limited* 
Zapopan NL 
* Member of the Australian Mining Industry Council 
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AppendixB 
Wei~hting Score Index 
Voluntary Environmental Items 
L COMPAN1ES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Adoption of environmentally sensitive 
management technique 
Departments or offices for environmental affairs 
Setting up objectives and strategies for the 
environment 
Environmental awareness campaign 
Compliance with government environmentai 
principles and regulations 
lmplementatio;.1 of e.'lvironmental audit 
Establishment of environmental programs 
II. RECOGNffiON OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACilVITIES 
8 
9. 
Evidence of public support or approval 
Awards for environmental protection 
III. PREVENTION OR REPAIR OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
Treatment of waste disposal 
(e.g., recycling efforts) 
Adoption of safe environmental practices or 
improvements in environmental facilities 
Air, water and soil emissions 
Undertaking wildlife preservation 
Estimated future costs for environmental 
rehabilitation (restoration) activities (not as parts 
of financial statement) 
Environmental impact assessment and 
research programs for environment 
Conservation of natural resources or energy 
saving measure 
Land reclamation 
Current costs for environmental rehabilitation 
(restoration) activities (not as parts of financial 
statement) 
Tree replanting (revegetation) scheme 
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Mean Score 
4.00 
2.18 
4.18 
3.14 
8.20 
5.00 
6.00 
3.40 
3.00 
5.87 
5.95 
4.60 
3.30 
6.80 
4.46 
3.40 
4.36 
5.36 
3.68 
Appendix B (Continued) 
Weighting Score Index 
Voluntary Environmental Items 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES 
20. Admission of causing environmental problems 
(i.e. health related) for residents 
21. Acknowledgment of detrimental effects of 
activities 
22. Litigation related to environment 
(not listed in contingent liabilities) 
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TOTAL 
Mean Score 
3.56 
4.10 
5.46 
100 
AppendixC 
SCORING SHEET 
FIRM IDENTIFICATION 
Company Name: 
Balance Date: 
1. Gross plant assets: 
2. Total Assets: 
3. Total Debt: 
4. Ownership Diffusion: 
5. Total ordinary shares: 
6. Total Sales: 
7. Net Income: 
(before extraordinary items & 
income tax) 
8. Income attributable to 
shareholders (after extraordi-
nary items and income tax): 
9. Market Capitalisation: 
10. Beta (8): 
11. Auditor Name:----------------------
12. The Presence of Environmental Committee: 
13. Membership of AMIC 
14. Commercial Production 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Additional Information:--------------------
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Appendix C (Continued) 
SCORING SHEET 
Ratio Variables 
Total Debt 
1. Operating Leverage=-----
(1992) Total Assets 
Total Debt 
Operating Leverage =-----
(1993) Total Assets 
Net income before extraordinary 
2. Return on Assets = items and income tax 
(1992) Total Assets 
Net income before extraordinary 
Return on Assets = items and income tax 
(1993) Total Assets 
Net income after extraordinary 
3. Return on Equity = items and income tax 
(1992) Total ordinary shares 
Net income after extraordinary 
Return on Equity = it1ems and income tax 
(1993) Total ordinary shares 
Gross plant assets 
4. Capital Intensity ---------
(1993) Total Sales 
142 
-.p. 
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Appendix C (Continued) 
SCORING SHEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL ITEMS 
l COMPANIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
1. Setting up objectives and strategies for the 
environment 
2. Establishment of environmental programs 
3. Adoption of environmentally sensitive 
management technique 
4. Compliance with government environmental 
principles and regulations 
5. Implementation of environmental audit 
6. Environmental awareness campaign 
7. Departments or offices for environmental affairs 
Total 
Il. RECOGNmON OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACTIVITIES 
8. Awards for environmental protection 
9. Evidence of public support or approval 
Total 
INDEX I 
(No. of words) 
INDEX II 
(Unweighted) 
INDEXill 
(Weighted) 
..... 
.;=i. 
.a:=. 
Appendix C (Continued) 
SCORING SHEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL ITEMS 
m. PREVENTION OR REPAIR OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
10. Conservation of natural resources or energy 
saving measure 
11. Current costs for environmental rehabilitation 
(restoration) activities (not as parts of financial 
statement) 
12 . Estimated future costs for environmental 
rehabilitation (restoration) activities (not as parts 
of financial statement) 
13. Land reclamation 
14. Tree replanting (revegetation) scheme 
15. Treatment of waste disposal 
(e.g., recycling efforts) 
16. Adoption of safe environmental practices or 
improvements in environmental facilities 
17. Undertaking wildlife preservation 
18. Environmental impact assessment and 
research programs for environment 
19. Air, water and soil emissions 
Total 
INDEX I 
(No. of words) 
INDEX II 
(Unwelghted) 
INDEXID 
(Welghl2d) 
~ 
~ 
VI 
Appendix C (Continued) 
SCORING SHEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL ITEMS 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES 
20. Acknowledgment of detrimental effects of 
activities 
21. Litigation related to environment 
(not listed in contingent liabilities) 
22. Admission of causing environmental problems 
(i.e. health related) for residents 
SUMMARY 
Group I 
Group II 
Group ID 
Group IV 
TOTAL SCORE 
Indexl 
Total 
Index II Indexm 
INDEX I 
(No. of words) 
INDEX II 
(Unweighted) 
INDEXill 
(Weigh12d) 
~-
Appendix D. 
Correlation Matrix: Model 1 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnMARCAP SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
(. ) 
LnCAPINT 0.2185 1.0000 
(0.056) (.) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) ( . ) 
- LnLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1615 1.0000 .a:i,. 
0\ (0.681) (0.073) (0.151) ( . ) 
LnMARCAP 0.3089 0.3098 0.1271 0.0412 1.0000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.271) (0.722) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 -0.1866 -0.2240 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.050) (. ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5732 -0.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000) (0.217) (.) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 -0.0668 0.0493 -0.1171 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 
(0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.311) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
LnROE92 0.1775 -0.0356 -0.0633 -0.0232 -0.1375 0.1161 -0.2800 0.4181 1.0000 
(0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841) (0.233) (0.315) (0.014) (0.000) (.) 
SqrtOLS -0.3061 -0.3494 -0.1283 0.1035 -0.2878 0.2908 -0.3279 0.0073 0.2437 1.0000 (0.007) (0.002) (0.266) (0.370) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.950) (0.033) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 2 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnSALES SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
( . ) 
LnCAPlNT 0.2185 1.0000 
(0.056) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) ( . ) 
-~ I..nLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1651 1.0000 
...,a (0.681) (0 .073) (0.151) ( . ) 
LnSALES 0.3649 0.2126 0.2482 0.3609 1.0000 
(0.001) (0.063) (0.030) (0.001) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 -0.1866 -0.2703 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.017) ( . ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5780 -0.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000) (0.217) ( . ) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 0.0668 0.0493 -0.0564 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 
(0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.626) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
·:~ LnROE92 0.1775 -0.0356 0.0633 -0.0232 -0.0929 0.1161 -0.2800 0.4181 1.0000 
(0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841) (0.422) (0.315} (0.014) (0 .OOO) (.) 
SqrtOLS -0.3061 -0.3494 -0.1283 0.1035 -0.3281 0.2908 -0.3279 0.0073 0.2437 1.0000 (0.007) (0.002} (0.266) (0.370) (0.004) (0.010} (0.004) (0.950) (0.033) (.) 
---~---------------
,, 
• The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D ( Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 3 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnASSETS SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.2185 1.0000 
(0.056) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) ( . ) 
- LnLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1651 1.0000 ~ 
00 (0.681) (0.073) (0.151) ( . ) 
LnASSETS 0.4102 0.3436 0.2467 0.2846 1.0000 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.031) (0.012) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 -0.1866 -0.2640 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.020) (. ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5909 -0.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000) (0.217) ( . ) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 -0.0668 0.0493 -0.0775 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 
(0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.503) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
LnROE92 -0.1775 -0.0356 -0.0633 -0.0232 -0.0898 0.1161 -o.28or. 0.4181 1.0000 
(0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841) (0.438) (0.315) (0.014) (0.000) (.) 
SqrtOLS -0.3061 -0.3494 -0.1283 0.1035 -0.3744 0.2908 -0.3279 0.0073 0.2437 1.0000 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.266) (0.370) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.950) (0.033) (.} 
• The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 4 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnASSETS SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 LNSW 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.2185 1.0000 
(0.056) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) ( . ) 
..... LnLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1651 1.0000 ~ (0.681) (0.073) (0.151) ( . ) \0 
LnASSETS 0.4102 0.3436 0.2467 0.2846 1.0000 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.031) (0.012) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 -0.1866 -0.2640 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.020) ( . ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5909 -0.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000) (0.217) ( . ) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 -0.0668 0.0493 -0.0775 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 
(0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.503) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
LnROE92 -0.1755 -0.0356 -0.0633 -0.0232 -0.0898 0.1161 -0.2800 0.4181 1.0000 
(0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841) (0.438} (0.315) (0.014) (0.000) (.) 
LnSW -0.2682 -0.3199 -0.0388 0.0078 -0.3350 0.3945 -0.3647 0.3240 0.2494 1.0000 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.737) (0.947) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.029) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 5 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnSALES SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 LNSW 
AUD 1.0000* 
( . ) 
LnCAPINT 0.2185 1.0000 
(0.056) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) (.) 
... LnLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1651 1.0000 u. 
0 (0.681) (0.073) (0.151) ( . ) 
LnSALES 0.3649 0.2126 0.2482 0.3609 1.0000 
(0.001) (0.063) (0.030) (0.001) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 -0.1866 -0.2703 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.017) ( . ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5780 -u.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000:, (0.217) ( . ) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 0.0668 0.0493 -0.0564 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 (0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.626) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
LnROE92 0.1775 -0.0356 -0.0633 -0.0232 -0.0929 0.1161 -0.2800 0.4181 1.0000 (0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841~ (0.422) (0.315) (0.014) (0.000) (.) 
LnSW -0.2682 -0.3199 -0.0388 0.0078 -0.4177 0.3945 -0.3647 0.3240 0.2494 1.0000 (0.018) (0.005) (0.737) (0.947) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.029) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D { Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 6 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV92 LnMARCAP SqrtOWN PRES LnROA92 LnROE92 LNSW 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.2185 1.0000* 
(0.056) (.) 
ENCO 0.1055 0.0701 1.0000 
(0.361) (0.545) ( . ) 
-
I..nLEV92 0.0476 -0.2058 0.1651 l.0000 VI (0.681) (0.073) (0.151) ( . ) .... 
LnMARCAP 0.3089 0.3098 0.1271 0.0412 1.0000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.271) (0.722) (. ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1600 -0.3386 -0.1739 0.1866 -0.2240 1.0000 
(0.164) (0.003) (0.130) (0.104) (0.050) (. ) 
PRES 0.1966 0.2436 0.1880 0.0963 0.5732 -0.1422 1.0000 
(0.087) (0.033) (0.102) (0.405) (0.000) (0.217) ( . ) 
LnROA92 -0.1566 -0.1906 -0.0668 0.0493 -0.1171 0.1759 -0.1334 1.0000 
(0.174) (0.097) (0.564) (0.670) (0.311) (0.126) (0.247) (.) 
LnROE92 -0.1775 -0.0356 -0.0633 -0.0232 -0.1375 0.1161 -0.2800 0.4181 1.0000 
(0.123) (0.759) (0.584) (0.841) (0.233) (0.315) (0.014) (0.000) ( . ) 
LnSW -0.2682 -0.3199 -0.0388 0.0078 -0.2811 0.3945 -0.3647 0.3240 0.2494 1.0000 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.737) (0.947) (0.0B) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.029) (.) 
• The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 7 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnMARCAP SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 LNSW 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.1884 1.0000 
(0.099) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) ( . ) 
-
LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 Vl (0.689) (0.489) (0.963) ( . ) N 
LnMARCAP 0.2850 0.3133 0.1254 0.0423 1.0000 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.274) (0.713) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2186 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.055) ( . ) 
PRES -0.2107 0.2337 0.1695 0.0207 0.5653 -0.1478 1.0000 
(0.067) (0.039) (C,.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) (.) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.3232 0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 
(0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.004) (0.325) (0.003) (.) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1927 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 
(0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.091) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) (.) 
LnSW -0.2608 -0.3183 -0.0389 -0.1227 -0.2805 0.3935 -0.3636 0.1822 0.2770 1.0000 (0.021) (0.005) (0.735) (0.284) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.110) (0.014) (.) 
. ------------------
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 8 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnSALES SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 LNSW 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.1184 1.0000 
(0.099) (.) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) ( . ) 
-
LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 IJl 
w (0.689) (0.489) (0.963) ( . ) 
LnSALES 0.3664 0.2064 0.2492 0.3395 1.0000 
(0.001) (0.070) (0.028) (0.002) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2732 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.016) ( . ) 
PRES 0.2107 0.2337 0.1895 0.0207 0.5796 -0.1478 1.0000 
(0.064) (0.039) (0.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) ( . ) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.2363 -0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 
(0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.037) (0.325) (0.003) (.) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1182 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 
(0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.303) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) (.) 
LnSW -0.2608 -0.3183 -0.0389 -0.1227 -0.4173 0.3935 -0.3636 0.1822 0.2770 1.0000 (0.021) (0.005) (0.735) (0.284) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.110) (0 .014) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 9 
-
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnASSETS SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 LNSW 
--AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.1884 1.0000 
(0.099) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) ( . ) 
-
LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 VI 
~ (0.689) (0.489) (0.963) ( . ) 
LnASSETS 0.4005 0.3411 0.2469 0.1930 1.0000 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.029) (0.091) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2640 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.020) ( . ) 
PRES 0.2107 0.2337 0.1895 0.0207 0.5896 -0.1478 1.0000 
(0.068) (0.039) (0.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) (.) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.2473 0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 
(0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.029) (0.325) (0.003) (.) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1227 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 
(0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.284) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) (.) 
LnSW -0.2608 -0.3183 -0.0389 -0.1227 -0.3350 0.3935 -0.3636 0.1822 0.2770 1.0000 (0.021) (0.005) (0.735) (0.284) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.110) (0.014) (.) 
- ~---··-··---·---
• 1fie top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 10 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnASSETS SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
( . ) 
LnCAPINT 0.1884 1.0000 
(0.099) ( . ) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) ( . ) 
-
LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 (.,A (0.689) (0.489) (0.963) ( . ) (.,A 
LnASSETS 0.4005 0.3411 0.2469 0.1930 1.0000 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.029) (0.091) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2640 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.020) ( . ) 
PRES 0.2107 0.2337 0.1895 0.0207 0.5896 -0.1478 1.0000 
(0.064) (0.039) (0.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) (.) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.2473 0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 
(0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.029) (0.325) (0.003) (.) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1227 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 (0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.284) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) (.) 
SqrtOLS -0.2940 -0.3490 -0.1279 0.1492 -0.3742 0.2890 -0.3257 0.3150 0.2067 1.0000 (0.009) (0.002) (0.264) (0.192) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.069) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: Model 11 
' AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnSALES SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.1884 1.0000 
(0.099) (.) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) ( . ) 
- LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 t.11 
°' 
(0.689) (0.489) !0.963) ( . ) 
LnSALES 0.3664 0.2064 0.2492 0.3395 1.0000 
(0.001) (0.070) (0.028) (0.002) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2732 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.016) ( . ) 
PRES 0.2107 0.2337 0.1895 0.0207 0.5796 -0. 1478 1.0000 
(0.064) (0.039) (0.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) ( . ) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.2363 0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 
{0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.037) (0.325) (0.003) ( . ) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1182 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 
(0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.303) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) ( . ) 
SqrtOLS -0.2940 -0.3490 -0.1279 0.1492 -0.3270 0.2890 -0.3257 0.3150 0.2067 1.0000 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.264) (0.192) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.069) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
Appendix D (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix: 1'fodel 12 
AUD LnCAPINT ENCO LnLEV93 LnMARCAP SqrtOWN PRES LnROA93 LnROE93 SqrtOLS 
AUD 1.0000* 
(.) 
LnCAPINT 0.1884 1.0000 
(0.099) {.) 
ENCO 0.1087 0.0673 1.0000 
(0.343) (0.558) (.) 
-
LnLEV93 0.0460 -0.0796 0.0053 1.0000 V. (0.689) (0.489) (0.963) ( . ) 
-..,! 
LnMARCAP 0.2850 0.3133 0.1254 0.0423 1.0000 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.274) (0.713) ( . ) 
SqrtOWN -0.1735 -0.3290 -0.1753 -0.2074 -0.2186 1.0000 
(0.129) (0.003) (0.125) (0.068) (0.055) ( . ) 
PRES 0.2107 0.2337 0.1895 0.0207 0.5653 -0.1478 1.0000 
(0.064) (0.039) (0.097) (0.857) (0.000) (0.196) ( . ) 
LnROA93 -0.2077 -0.1214 -0.0916 0.1955 -0.3232 0.1128 -0.3350 1.0000 (0.068) (0.290) (0.425) (0.086) (0.004) (0.325) (0.003) (.) 
LnROE93 -0.1317 -0.0339 0.0080 0.0225 -0.1927 0.1122 -0.2733 0.2512 1.0000 
(0.250) (0.768) (0.945) (0.845) (0.091) (0.328) (0.015) (0.027) (.) 
SqrtOLS -0.2940 -0.3490 -0.1279 0.1492 -0.2880 0.2890 -0.3257 0.3150 0.2067 1.0000 (0.009) (0.002) (0.264) (0.192) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.069) (.) 
* The top number represents the degree of correlation and the bottom number represents the level of significance. 
AppendixE 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression 
Variables W Qrd lndi!2S Uo~~ighted lnd~2S Weighted Ind~~ 
R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F 
Total Disclosure 
Model 1 0.529 0.458 7.413 0.586 0.523 9.330 0.443 0.359 5.255 
Model 2 0.525 0.453 7.306 0.598 0.537 9.802 0.460 0.378 5.614 
Model 3 0.524 0.451 7.251 0.600 0.539 9.895 0.457 0.375 5.558 
Model 4 0.526 0.454 7.327 0.599 0.539 9.874 0.463 0.382 5.699 
Models 0.536 0.466 7.638 0.607 0.548 10.203 0.478 0.399 6.039 
Model6 C'.531 0.460 7.481 0.586 0.523 9.338 0.450 0.367 5.398 
- 0.578 9.159 0.430 0.345 5.064 (A Model 7 0.514 0.442 7.090 0.514 
00 Models 0.522 0.451 7.313 0.619 0.562 10.862 0.457 0.376 5.643 
Model 9 0.512 0.439 7.028 0.600 0.541 10.060 0.447 0.364 5.415 
Model 10 0.507 0.433 6.876 0.599 0.540 10.026 0.430 0.345 5.051 
Model 11 0.508 0.435 6.921 0.609 0.550 10.421 0.429 0.343 5.029 
Model 12 0.510 0.437 6.984 0.577 0.514 9.131 0.414 0.327 4.741 
Category 1 
Model 1 0.552 0.484 8.138 0.540 0.471 7.763 0.441 0.357 5.213 
Model 2 0.553 0.485 8.169 0.550 0.482 8.069 0.450 0.367 5.405 
Model 3 0.570 0.505 8.754 0.549 0.480 8.024 0.448 0.364 5.355 
Mode14 0.573 0.509 8.871 0.553 0.485 8.157 0.452 0.369 5.449 
Models 0.568 0.503 8.693 0.568 0.502 8.672 0.465 0.384 S.734 
Model 6 0.554 0.486 8.195 0.542 0.473 7.812 0.444 0.359 5.265 
Model 7 0.537 0.468 7.768 0.539 0.471 7.844 0.418 0.332 4.819 
Models 0.572 0.508 8.961 0.589 0.527 9.594 0.447 0.36.5 4.417 
Model 9 0.564 0.499 8.658 0.558 0.492 8.455 0.430 0.345 5.063 
Model 10 0.565 0.500 8.696 0.557 0.491 8.432 0.424 0.338 4.938 
Model 11 0.565 0.500 8.710 0.578 0.515 9.187 0.432 0.347 5.094 
Model 12 0.536 0.466 7.732 0.538 0.468 7.787 0.414 0.327 4.742 
Appe;:\dix E (Continued) 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression 
Variables WQrd Index Unri~igbt~d Ind~ Weighted Index 
R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F 
Category2 
Modell 0.382 0.288 4.081 0.387 0.294 4.170 0.284 0.176 2.621 
Model 2 0.414 0.325 4.662 0.431 0.345 4.999 0.370 0.274 3.872 
Model3 0.464 0.383 5.720 0.476 0.396 5.988 0.385 0.292 4.133 
Model 4 0.451 0.368 5.430 0.462 0.381 5.671 0.353 0.255 3.596 
Models 0.413 0.324 4.648 0.431 0.345 5.009 0.355 0.258 3.638 
i-& Model 6 0.379 0.285 4.025 0.384 0.291 4.112 0.267 0.156 2.405 
VI Model 7 0.415 0.328 4.754 0.423 0.337 4.912 0.276 0.168 2.556 
'° Model 8 0.464 0.385 5.811 0.482 0.404 6.224 0.364 0.269 3.830 Model 9 0.483 0.406 6.269 0.492 0.417 6.501 0.354 0.258 3.674 
ModellO 0.487 0.410 6.350 0.496 0.420 6.S82 0.354 0.258 3.672 
Model 11 0.458 0.377 5.655 0.474 0.395 6.029 0.348 0.251 3.575 
Model 12 0.414 0.327 4.737 0.422 0.336 4.893 0.269 0.160 2.471 
Category3 
Model 1 0.512 0.438 6.918 0.489 0.411 6.308 0.395 0.304 4.317 
Model 2 0.511 0.437 6.908 0.508 0.434 6.825 0.417 0.329 4.722 
Model3 0.529 0.458 7.423 0.523 0.451 7.239 0.427 0.340 4.919 
Model4 0.524 0.452 7.268 0.518 0.445 7.085 0.419 0.331 4.756 
Model 5 0.509 0.435 6.846 0.507 0.432 6.786 0.415 0.326 4.677 
Model 6 0.512 0.438 6.913 0.489 0.411 6.314 0.392 0.300 4.252 
Model 7 0.473 0.394 6.016 0.470 0.390 5.930 0.349 0.252 3.592 
Models 0.490 0.414 6.449 0.504 0.430 6.819 0.381 0.289 4.128 
Model9 0.502 0.428 6.758 0.511 0.438 7.001 0.388 0.296 4.244 
Model 10 0.504 0.430 6.811 0.514 0.441 7.074 0.386 0.294 4.205 
Model 11 0.489 0.413 6.409 0.503 0.429 6.784 0.372 0.278 3.966 
Model 12 0.473 0.394 6.016 0.470 0.390 5.930 0.346 0.248 3.538 
Appendix E (Continued) 
Results of OLS Multiple Regression 
Variables Wgrd Ind~2S. u n~~jght~d I0d~2S. Weighted Index 
R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F R2 Adj.R2 F 
Category4 
Model 1 0.179 0.054 1.435 0.228 0.111 1.946 0.152 0.023 1.181 
Model 2 0.184 0.061 1.490 0.209 0.089 1.739 0.167 0.041 1.322 
Model 3 0.162 0.035 1.279 0.198 0.076 1.629 0.136 0.006 1.042 
Model 4 0.149 0.020 1.152 0.198 0.076 1.627 0.126 -0.006 0.952 
Model 5 0.167 0.041 1.323 0.202 0.081 1.670 0.151 0.022 1.174 
Model 6 0.173 0.048 1.384 0.239 0.124 2.071 0.149 0.020 1.158 
.- Mode17 0.229 0.114 1.989 0.252 0.140 2.258 0.173 0.049 1.400 0\. 
0 Models 0.204 0.085 1.719 0.222 0.106 1.914 0.162 0.037 1.297 
Model 9 0.192 0.071 1.589 0.208 0.090 1.760 0.144 0.016 1.125 
Model 10 0.195 0.075 1.626 0.206 0.088 1.739 0.145 0.017 1.132 
Model 11 0.209 0.091 1.768 0.225 0.109 1.946 0.163 0.038 1.308 
Model12 0.230 0.115 1.998 0.246 0.134 2.187 0.173 0.049 1.398 
